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Abstract
This dissertation present three studies related to the factors that may help
explain differential farm outcomes and marketing strategies among farmers
in India. I focus my analysis on two sources: social networks and market
access.
In chapter two, I analyze how peers can affect farmers’ cash crop revenues.
Crop revenues vary greatly among farmers and the source of that variation
is not fully understood. Using a household survey from India, we estimate
peer effects on cash crop revenue. Results show that 60% of farmers’ revenue
is explained by peers. Peer effects in input expenditures and land allocation
cannot fully explain the variation in revenue, implying peers may also as-
sociate with management, negotiation and marketing strategies. Although
caste-based networks are important, their effect is smaller than that of self-
reported peer networks. Peer effects are strongest for agricultural peers and
in the cultivation of a new crop.
In chapter three, I ask to what extent an exogenous shock to agricultural
credit provision may help farmers improve farm gate prices at sale. Farm gate
prices for crops in many developing countries vary widely within a cropping
season, by village, and by farmer. One hypothesis for this heterogeneity
is that farmers are prevented from arbitraging prices due to lack of credit,
forcing them to sell right at harvest, or in response to an immediate need
for cash, such as illness. Even with credit, farmers need to have access to
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agricultural markets to take advantage of price arbitrage opportunities. In
this paper, using longitudinal data on 1,348 households in India, we ask
whether farmers are able to obtain higher farm gate prices when they have
improved access to credit. We use the increase in agricultural loans associated
with state elections as the exogenous shock to credit supply. Second, we ask
how access to open markets associates with farm gate prices, and whether
those with greater access to markets are better able to take advantage of the
credit increase. We find that increased credit affects farm gate prices, but
largely for crops other than paddy and wheat, which are highly regulated.
Further, we find that greater access to markets improves farm gate prices,
and enhances the benefits of the increased credit. We rule out price effects
of elections through other agricultural assistance programs, and credit from
other sources. Thus, we find evidence that improving farmers’ ability to
access arbitrage opportunities can improve their crop revenue.
Finally, in chapter four, I investigate if social networks are associated with a
long-run crop-specific relationship between a farmer and a trader. A farmer’s
long-term relationship with a trader can improve access to market informa-
tion, but removes the farmers’ option to sell to other traders in a specific
year. Social networks could act either as substitutes to traders, helping
disseminate market information and fostering economies of scale, or as com-
plements, where farmers help build relationships between their trader and
their peers. Using a household survey from India, we investigate whether
and how social networks are associated with a farmer’s choice to enter into a
long-term relationship with a trader. We find that peers directly affect such
choice. Further, we find that network characteristics and the household’s
position within that network influence the decision to have a long-term re-
lationship. Specifically, the more central position of the household and the
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smaller number of connections with other households, the higher the likeli-
hood a household has a long-term relationship with at least one trader. We
rule out that these effects are driven by proximity.
iv
To my family, for forever love and support.
v
Acknowledgments
This dissertation would never have been possible without the immense ef-
fort of my advisor, Kathy Baylis, for her guidance, support, and encourage-
ment. Kathy spent countless hours teaching me how to do research better,
and always with extraordinary patience, energy, and inspiration during the
five years I have worked with her. I am grateful to other members of my
committee namely Ashwini Chhatre, Mindy Mallory, Hope Michelson, and
Alex Winter-Nelson for numerous iterations of advice and suggestions. My
research is definitely a better product because of their help. I also thank
several other faculty members at Illinois for useful discussions about my
research and graduate school experience including Amy Ando, Mary Arends-
Kuenning, David Bullock, Ben Crost, Paul Ellinger, Phil Garcia, Barrett
Kirwan, and Carl Nelson. All their help greatly helped me to become a
better scholar and researcher.
The support from other staff members in ACE has made my graduate
school life a pleasant and enjoyable one. I thank Pam Splittstoesser, Melissa
Warmbier, Donna Stites, Susan King, and Lori Snipes for their help with
numerous errands and administrative processes during my time at Illinois. I
am fortunate to have excellent classmates and peers at Illinois. Atul Nepal,
Xin Li, Hanbum Lee, and several others have been of enormous help for my
research. I also thank Christine Jolejole-Foreman and Abhilasha Acharya for
help with data.
vi
I acknowledge generous funding from the ADM Institute of Post-harvest
Loss at University of Illinois for my dissertation work and fieldwork in India.
I also acknowledge the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT)
for the excellent internship opportunities during my doctoral program.
Finally, I am forever grateful to my parents, Santi and Waraporn; thank
you for your support and patience that made my life in a foreign country as
comfortable as in my native Thailand. My sister, Sitabha, has been instru-
mental in motivating me to always stay put and keep moving forward.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 CAN PEERS IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL REV-
ENUE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Setting and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Peer Effects and Cash Crop Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Relevance to Rural Development Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CHAPTER 3 EFFECTS OF CREDIT AND MARKET ACCESS
ON FARM GATE PRICES IN INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1 Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Setting and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
CHAPTER 4 FRIENDS OR TRADERS? DO SOCIAL NETWORKS
EXPLAIN THE USE OF MARKET MECHANISMS BY FARM-
ERS IN INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1 Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Data and Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.6 Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
viii
APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.1 Identification of Peer Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.2 Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER
4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.1 Definitions of Network Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Illustration of Social Network Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . 124
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
For several decades, economists have tried to explain the considerable ob-
served variation in business outcomes across firms and households. In the
developing world, where market frictions are often high, economic outcomes
can vary substantially (Bloom et al., 2013). However, the cause of this vari-
ation is not well understood. Agricultural outcomes in the developing world
represent a unique example of this interesting puzzle. Farm profits and rev-
enues can exhibit large differences even within the same region, after control-
ling for input use, technology adoption, and agro-climatic factors (Fan et al.,
2000; Murgai et al., 2001).
Why do some farmers have better outcomes than others? One possible
explanation is that farmers face differential costs of information related to
production practices and differential transaction costs when marketing their
products (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002).1 In this dissertation, I address two
external factors that are associated with the variation in farm outcomes in a
developing country setting: markets and social institutions.
The setting of my dissertation is in rural India, where access to markets
and social institutions can be limited, and having differential access to mar-
kets and social institutions may translate to substantially different outcomes
among farmers. Even if the access to markets improve, farmers usually face
several other constraints to their marketing. In the chapters of my disser-
tation, I argue that the access to information (Chapters 2 and 4), physical
markets (Chapter 3), and agricultural credit (Chapter 3) may vary substan-
tially among farmers even within the same village and in the same time
period. Therefore, a number of farmers in India rely on their peer networks
as the main source of communicating market information, sharing risks, and
1It is important to note that I cannot explicitly measure information costs. Within the
context of my dissertation, information cost is assumed to be implicit and is manifested
in the form of transactions cost.
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enabling economies of scale. Analyzing factors that may help farmers im-
prove their farm outcomes is particularly important for both welfare and
policy implications. Small-scale farmers are highly dependent on their crop
revenue, and even a small increase in received crop price can greatly increase
their household food security and improve their welfare outcomes.
In Chapter 2, I test whether the variation in peers’ cash crop revenues
may help explain the variation in farmers’ outcome.2 Using individual-level
information about social relationships from a household survey, I follow a
novel identification strategy which allows me to account for the problem
of peers’ outcomes being endogenous (Lee, 2007; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
While noting the significance of peer effects on farmers’ cash crop revenues, I
provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation to show that peer effects through
input use and land allocation cannot fully explain the peer effects in cash
crop revenues. This finding suggests that peers may also be important for
other factors including management, negotiation, and marketing strategies.
I extend my analysis to cover a broad range of peer networks and find the
most significant effect among self-reported peers, which suggests that our
findings are not largely driving by the effects of geographical proximity or
caste groups.
In Chapter 3, I explore how the differential access to agricultural credit
and markets farm gate prices at the time of sale.3 Using a longitudinal
household survey with detailed crop transaction data, and geocoded weekly
market price and delivery data, I exploit the plausibly exogenous variation
in credit provision ahead of state-level elections (Cole, 2009). My results
indicate that increased access to credit from public banks ahead of elections
along with greater market access increase farm gate prices for crops other
than paddy and wheat, which are under price intervention through direct
procurement throughout the year. I find the strongest effect of increased
credit on prices among small farmers, who might have very little outside
options of accessing agricultural credit. Larger farmers also benefit for the
increased credit provision though being able to borrow more cheaply at a
lower interest rate, but do not benefit from increased farm gate prices. To
provide qualifications for my analysis, I verify that the results are not largely
driven by government-sponsored agricultural assistance programs including
2This chapter is co-authored with Kathy Baylis, Ashwini Chhatre and Hope Michelson.
3This chapter is co-authored with Kathy Baylis and Mindy Mallory.
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crop insurance and input subsidy.
In Chapter 4, I explore the association between farmers’ social network
characteristics and their decisions to have a crop-specific long-term relation-
ship with at least one trader.4 While traders may help farmers by providing
market information and guarantee constant demand for their crops, they
are usually also the sources of credit. Requiring credit for cultivation pur-
poses, farmers have to sell their crops immediately after harvest, resulting
lower prices for their crops (Mitra et al., 1986). Using a household survey
containing detailed information about interpersonal relationships, I use so-
cial network analysis to derive social network characteristics of farmer in my
sample. I find that social network characteristics are important determinants
of a long-term relationship between a farmer and a trader. Moreover, using
a spatial econometric approach, I find that the decision to have a long-term
relationship is also dependent on farmers’ peers. Finally, I verify that the
effects of geographical proximity do not drive the results.
4This chapter is co-authored with Kathy Baylis, Ashwini Chhatre, Hope Michelson and
Satya Prasanna.
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CHAPTER 2
CAN PEERS IMPROVE AGRICULTURAL
REVENUE?
2.1 Introduction and Motivation
Economists have long tried to explain the considerable observed variation
in economic outcomes across firms and households. In developing countries
where market frictions are frequently high, economic outcomes can vary dra-
matically (Bloom et al., 2013). Agriculture in the developing world provides
a special example of this puzzle; farm revenues and profits tend to exhibit
wide differences within the same region, even after accounting for inputs,
technology use and agro-climatic factors (Fan et al., 2000; Murgai et al.,
2001).
Why do some farmers earn more than others? One possible explanation is
that differences in revenues reflect differential farmer access to information
about production practices and marketing (Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010; Conley
and Udry, 2010; Birthal et al., 2015). While agricultural extension services
offer one mechanism to disseminate new techniques and market opportunities
(Roeling, 1984), information flow through such official channels may still be
limited, particularly for more complex practices which benefit from demon-
stration (Anderson and Feder, 2004; Duflo et al., 2011; Waddington et al.,
2014). Researchers have hypothesized that, in contexts characterized by lim-
ited formal mechanisms for information dissemination, a farmer’s peers are
likely to play a critical role in disseminating production and marketing infor-
mation as individuals have been found to learn from peers about new tech-
nologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson,
2012; Magnan et al., 2015), credit (Okten and Osili, 2004; Wydick et al.,
2011), labor recruitment (Mano et al., 2011), household decision-making
(Kandpal and Baylis, 2015), and risk mitigation (Di Falco and Bulte, 2013).
These sorts of endogenous social effects are often called peer effects in the
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literature and refer to the relationship between the behavior or outcomes of
an individual and the behavior or outcomes of a social group of which the
individual is a member (Manski, 1993).
This paper tests how a farmer’s agricultural revenues are influenced by
the revenues and characteristics of his or her peers. I study the revenues of
small farmers in Thaltukhod Valley, Himachal Pradesh, India. These small
farmers are highly dependent on crop revenues, and even a small increase in
crop prices or production can greatly increase their income. Understanding
how social connections might influence farmer outcomes can provide critical
insights into why some farmers escape poverty and others remain stuck at a
low level of productivity.
My study analyzes a data set from Thaltukhod Valley which surveyed all
522 households in the valley’s 17 villages and which exhibits considerable
variation in household cash crop revenues; up to 100-fold variation across
households. I find that peers have a significant effect on farmers’ cash crop
revenues. In fact, my results suggest that nearly 60% of the variation in
farmers’ cash crop revenues can be explained by the revenues of their peers.
My results imply that peers act as a critical channel of information for farm-
ers’ technology adoption and use. I find that peer effects operate through
farmers’ input choice, affecting the use of pesticides on all cash crops and
area under cultivation of peas, a relatively new cash crop in the valley. I find
that pesticide use is correlated over self-reported peers and not those who
are geographic neighbors – evidence that I observe more than the outcome of
a pest outbreak among farmers with nearby fields. Finally, I find that farm
input expenditures and land allocation cannot explain the full magnitude of
peer effects on farmers’ cash crop revenues, suggesting that peer effects likely
also operate through non-production channels such as prices or marketing
relationships (Songsermsawas et al., 2015).
My results make intuitive sense. First, pest infestations are sporadic and
vary in type and intensity from year to year. Second, peas are a recent
crop, introduced into the area not long before the survey was conducted.
Thus both pesticide use and area under pea cultivation are both domains in
which farmers are still likely to be actively experimenting and learning and
plausibly drawing on peers’ recent experience for insight and guidance.
My work builds on studies which have documented the importance of
farmer peers in decisions related to input use, land allocation, and sales
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revenues. For example, Conley and Udry (2010) find evidence that pineap-
ple farmers in Southern Ghana adjust the amount of fertilizer applied on
their plots based on peers’ positive outcomes. Munshi (2004) finds that land
allocation decisions among wheat farmers in India correspond significantly
to their peers’ experience. Fafchamps and Minten (2002) find that better
connected agricultural traders in Madagascar have higher sales volume than
their less connected peers. Note though a large number of studies have found
positive peer effects, negative peer effects (Kremer and Miguel, 2007), and
no peer effects (Duflo et al., 2011) have also been identified. Results from
these studies suggest that the extent to which peers can learn from others is
contingent on the type of the technology.
My paper makes three primary contributions to a growing number of stud-
ies linking personal relationships with economic outcomes. First, ours is
unique in focusing on farm revenues. Previous research on social relation-
ships and economic outcomes for small-scale farmers have mostly focused
on input use (Conley and Udry, 2010; Duflo et al., 2011), land allocation
(Munshi, 2004) and market information (Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010). My
study links these three factors – analyzing effects of peers on the total value
of farm output, which is closely related to household income, and therefore
household welfare (Huffman, 1976; Jacoby, 1991).
A second contribution of my study is the use of spatial econometric meth-
ods to account for the problem of peer outcomes bring simultaneously de-
termined (Manski, 1993; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). I also test for unobserved
characteristics that might be spatially correlated across farmers. Further, I
rule out the possibility that the significant peer effects in my estimates are
merely the result of peers simply facing similar environments or belonging to
the same peer group.
Third, I test the self-identified peer network against other, frequently used
definitions of peers. In contrast to previous studies (Holloway et al., 2002;
Helmers and Patnam, 2014), I do not find significant peer effects based on
geographic proximity, suggesting that geographically-related observed at-
tributes do not drive the peer effect results, and that physical proximity
is not a good proxy for peer networks in my context. I also compare the self-
reported networks to networks defined by caste and a “lead-farmer” model in
which I allow high-performing farmers in the village to influence other farm-
ers outcomes. Distinguishing which set of peers best explains the observed
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distribution of agricultural revenue is important for both future research and
targeting policy. While caste-defined peer networks do generate peer effects,
I find the strongest evidence of peer effects on cash crop revenue from self-
reported peers, especially among those peers who are farmers advisors for
agricultural matters.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I
outline the background of the setting in my study and present the descrip-
tive statistics of my survey and data. In Section 3, I use a simple model
to derive hypotheses I test in my estimations. Section 4 describes the esti-
mation strategy to identify peer effects on cash crop revenues and explains
several critical empirical assumptions. In Section 5, I report the validity of
the instruments and main empirical results. In Section 6, I explore possi-
ble mechanisms of peer effects and present back-of-the-envelope calculations
quantifying the magnitude of the coefficient estimates. I also conduct a num-
ber of robustness checks to rule out a number of confounding factors that
might drive my results. Section 7 presents a discussion of alternate specifi-
cations of peer networks for my estimations. In Section 8, I relate my results
to policy implications regarding rural development. Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Setting and Data
2.2.1 Thaltukhod Valley, India
The data come from a household survey of small-scale farmers in Thaltukhod
Valley, Himachal Pradesh, India. Figure 2.1 presents a map of the study area.
The survey collected information on all 522 households living in 17 villages
in Thaltukhod Valley. However, due to missing data, the total number of
observations used in this study is 509. The villages vary in size (between 11
and 66 households) and are located at a range of elevations throughout the
Valley.
The majority of the population in Thaltukhod consists of small-scale farm-
ers and primary sources of household income include cash crop cultivation
and livestock rearing. Farmers rely on the forest bordering each village for
fuel wood gathering (both for use and for sale), livestock grazing and col-
lection of fodder, timber and medicinal herbs. Households in each village
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own between two and seven plots varying in size, elevation and slope. Some
plots are shared among households in the same village. Within each plot,
each household owns a specific parcel. These parcels vary in size within and
across villages.
In 2008, a survey was administered to all households. Households were
asked questions about their livelihood activities for the previous five years
(2004-2008), and ten years ago (1998). The survey also collected social net-
work information for every household. Households were asked about cropping
rotation, land allocation decisions and input expenditures, revenue from sales
of cash crops and marketing channels.
Households in the Valley grow three main cash crops: kidney beans, pota-
toes and green peas and three main food crops: maize, wheat and barley.
Kidney beans and potatoes are traditional cash crops in Thaltukhod. Green
peas, however, were introduced recently, first appearing five years before the
survey was conducted. According to the data from the survey, all households
grow at least one of the three cash crops annually. Farmers sell cash crops in
a centralized market located down the Valley to agricultural traders. Anec-
dotally, the price of the crops farmers receive depends mostly on the timing
of sales. Most farmers sell from their farm to local traders who reside in their
own or a nearby village.
Households were asked two questions about their social relationships within
their own village.1 They were asked to name up to three households they con-
sult and visit most frequently for general livelihood matters. Approximately
45% of the households named only two other households in this category,
while the remaining households named three. Households were also asked to
list up to two more households they ask for advice specifically about cash
crops. I use the combination of these two sets to form the peer group for
each household. Thus, households can list up to a maximum of five different
households within the same village as peers. Of the two categories, 30% of
the households list five different peers in the two categories and 25% of the
households reported that their closest agricultural peers are also their general
1I only collected data on village as a social unit and that is the only relevant social
unit for network effects that I am interested in. The main reason is topography - it takes
a lot of effort to interact with people in other villages, unless it happens in the market or
during ceremonies/festivals. Both of these are somewhat random. The summary statistics
show that on average households go out of their villages during ceremonies/festivals only
five times during the past 12 months preceding the survey.
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peers.
2.2.2 Data
I first calculate the total cash crop revenue from all sales (in rupees) in a
growing season for each household. I use this variable as the main dependent
variable to test peer effects on cash crop revenue.2 I construct a weights
matrix based on self-reported relationships among households and include it
in the regressions. All social ties are directed but unweighted. Household
i is linked to household j with a directed link only if household i reported
household j as one of their peers.3 The link between households i and j is
unweighted because it does not take into account the strength of the tie. In
reality, certain ties might be stronger if certain pairs of farmers interact more
often than others. However, I do not have information about the intensity
of interactions, a limitation of this study.
Sample household summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1. House-
holds have an average of 5.71 members, of which 1.76 persons are between the
age of 0-14, 3.61 persons are between the ages of 15-60, and 0.35 persons are
above 60 years old. 85% of the households belong to the socially higher of the
two castes represented in the area. In each household, 40% of all members
report at least eight years of education, which is the compulsory education
level in India. Each household owns 8.18 bhigas of land, 6.20 of which is al-
located to grow cash crops.4 The average household livestock holding is 0.57
units (measured by headcount). Each household earns an average of 9,392
rupees from all cash crop sales during the 12 months preceding the survey.5
There is considerable variation in cash crop revenue across households and
across villages, ranging from 500 to 95,400 rupees in a growing season. I
present the kernel density estimations of total cash crop revenue across all
households in Figure 2.2 and that of cash crop revenue across four randomly
selected villages in Figure 2.3. These two figures help illustrate that con-
siderable heterogeneity exists in cash crop revenue both within and across
2Cash crop revenue is reported separately from each type of crop. The input variables,
however, are not broken down by crop.
3This construction implies the weights matrices are not symmetric, and I can identify
those households with more and less influence within the network.
41 bhiga = 0.2 acres = 0.0809 hectares.
51 Indian rupee was approximately $0.02 in 2008.
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villages.
2.3 Peer Effects and Cash Crop Revenue
In Thaltukhod Valley, farmers face several market inefficiencies which likely
limit farm investment and increase marketing cost, resulting in depressed
farm revenues. For example, access to information from outside Thaltukhod
Valley is scarce. Across all the villages there are only a few spots where a
cellular signal was available when the survey was conducted. Lack of access
to accurate market information prevents farmers from selling crops when
their prices are at their highest. One possible solution to these inefficiencies
is the diffusion of information through peers.
I use a simple model to explain the empirical tests I perform in this study.
Let a farmer (or household) i be a risk-neutral agent who sells crops for cash.
Let wi(Ni) represent the observed spatial dependence across peer farmers.
The extent to which peer effects from each peer are associated with a farmer’s
outcome may depend on Ni, which accounts for each farmer’s network char-
acteristics and h, which accounts for the different characteristics of each crop
grown by farmer i. I rewrite this unobserved correlation among peers for
farmer i, crop h as wih(Nih). This is the parameter of interest in this study.
Note that I treat all peers equally; I do not impose any weights of peers
that would introduce variation in each peer’s effect on an individual farmers’
outcomes.
Let a farmer’s cash crop revenue be as follows:
Rih = PihF (Kih, Tih). (2.1)
where Rih is the revenue of crop h grown by farmer i, Pih is the price per
unit farmer i receives for crop h, Kih is the aggregate investment used by
farmer i for crop h, Tih is the land area farmer h allocates for crop h and
F (.) represents the production function (which includes technology).
First, I test whether there is a relationship between farmers’ cash crop
revenue and the average of their peers’ revenue rih. That is, I test whether
the following relation exists
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Rih = f(wih(Nih)rih). (2.2)
Peer effects on cash crop revenue may originate from different components
of revenue. I test whether a relation exists between farmers’ input expendi-
tures, and between their land allocation decisions. However, I do not have
accurate farmer-specific price information in my dataset. Therefore, I cannot
directly test whether I observe peer effects in prices received.
K∗ih = f(wih(Nih)k
∗
ih|Rih). (2.3)
T ∗ih = f(wih(Nih)t
∗
ih|Rih). (2.4)
2.4 Estimation Strategy
2.4.1 Endogenous Peer Effects
The empirical model assumes that each individual’s outcome has a linear
relationship with his or her own individual characteristics, the average out-
come of peers in a reference group and peers’ individual characteristics (Lee,
2007; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
Given a population of size L, suppose that each household (or farmer)
i, (i = 1, ..., n) belongs to a specific peer group Si of size ni containing peers
j. Households do not belong to their own peer groups, i /∈ Si. Let yi be the
total cash crop revenue of household i. Let xi denote observed individual
characteristics of household i and there are k, (k = 1, ..., K) characteristics.
Specifically, the model can be expressed as follows:
yi = α + β
∑
j∈Si yj
ni
+ γxi + δ
∑
j∈Si xj
ni
+ i (2.5)
where the parameters β and δ capture endogenous and exogenous effects.
I require that |β| < 1.6 The error term i captures each household’s un-
observed individual characteristics. These unobserved characteristics are as-
sumed to be strictly exogenous, which implies E[i|xi] = 0. This specification
6This condition restricts that an individual’s own outcome cannot be dominated by
peer effects.
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assumes that i.i.d. samples are drawn from a population of size L with a fixed
and known network structure and strict exogeneity (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
Alternatively, this structural model can be illustrated in a matrix notation
given below:
y = l
′
α +Gy
′
β + x
′
γ +Gx
′
δ +  (2.6)
where y represents an n × 1 vector of outcomes for the entire population,
l is an n × 1 vector of ones, x is an n × k vector of observed individual
characteristics, G is a n×n weights matrix indicating personal relationships
between two households where Gij =
1
ni
if household i is a friend of household
j and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the matrix G represents the peer groups for
each household in the data.
Under this specification, the parameter β resembles the spatial auto-regressive
coefficient in a typical spatial lag model. My identification of peer effects
through social networks uses the variation in the average of peers’ outcomes
(endogenous effects) and average characteristics of peers (exogenous effects)
to explain a household’s revenue (Lee, 2007; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; Giorgi
et al., 2010). However, the average outcome of peers in a peer group is en-
dogenous. The endogeneity problem arises because individuals’ outcome and
the average outcome of their peers can be correlated with common unob-
served characteristics. Since it is likely that peers who belong to the same
peer group will have similar outcomes, the failure to correct for the endo-
geneity of the average peer outcomes will lead to biased estimates of peer
effects.
To account for the simultaneity problem, I employ a generalized two-stage
least squares (2SLS) method (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Lee, 2007).7 This
approach uses the average characteristics of friends of friends’ as the in-
strument set for the average outcome of peers (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). In
other words, G2x is the instrument set for Gy, which contains the average
characteristics of friends of friends. Since the average characteristics of an
individual’s friends of friends are exogenous to that individual’s own outcome
and are correlated with the average outcome of one’s peers, it satisfies the
exclusion restriction to be a valid instrument set for the average outcome
of that individual’s friends. That is, the observed attributes of friends of
7Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) note that since this approach does not assume homoskedas-
ticity, parameters estimates are only consistent, but not asymptotically normal.
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friends can only affect an individual’s outcome through the average outcome
of peers. I provide a detailed explanation which supports this identification
approach in Appendix A.
The rationale for my identification strategy in the context of my setting
can be illustrated with an example of three farmers A, B and C. A knows
B, B knows C but A does not know C. C receives a training about how to
cultivate and market peas more efficiently from a family friend who works as
an extension agent. C tells B about this new knowledge from the training.
Due to this new knowledge, B is able to cultivate peas more productively,
sell them when the prices are higher, and earn higher revenue. B may com-
municate this new knowledge to A, resulting in higher cash crop revenue for
A as well. Therefore, the only channel that this new knowledge about how
to cultivate and market peas more efficiently can transmit from C to A is
through B. Thus, I use C’s characteristics (their friendship with an extension
agent) for B’s outcome when estimating the effect of B’s outcome on A.
2.4.2 Validity of Instruments
I use the observed attributes of friends of friends as instruments for friends’
outcomes: proportion of land in cash crops, livestock ownership, number of
family members between 15-60 years of age, caste and total land holdings.
Like elsewhere in rural India, a higher caste status could indicate better ac-
cess to credit, leadership in local governing institutions and access to market
information. If a farmer has friends of friends who have greater access to
such information sources, that farmer’s friends could also benefit from im-
proved access to information. This effect might be particularly strong for
a household which belongs to the lower caste and has friends belonging to
the higher caste. Livestock ownership is another component that could also
affect the revenue of one’s friends. Since livestock can be a useful input in
agricultural production, peer farmers might bring their livestock to plow and
work on their plots together or farmers might borrow livestock from their
friends to work on their land, resulting in higher productivity and informa-
tion exchange. A farmer could receive advice and information from a farmer’s
friends through the livestock activities of friends of friends.
I test for robust pairwise correlation between each instrument (friends of
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friends’ exogenous characteristics) and outcome (cash crop revenue). The
results can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.2. All excluded instruments
exhibit significant coefficients. These results provide additional confirmation
that the observed attributes of friends of friends are highly correlated with
the average of cash crop revenue of friends.
2.4.3 Empirical Assumptions
Given the model specification and the nature of my data, the empirical model
requires several critical assumptions. First, the model assumes that indi-
viduals interact in groups. Individuals are affected by the actions of other
members within the same group and not from outside the group. This is a
standard assumption for peer effects models (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). This
assumption means that I assume a closed network at the village level, and
that cross-village relationships are not strong. While this assumption might
not sound realistic, but it was supported by anecdotal evidence from field
work in the area. Given the isolated nature of the villages in the area, I feel
it is plausible that within village networks are more important than across
village networks.
Second, I row-normalize the weights matrix according to the specification
in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). This normalization assumes that each peer named
by an individual with fewer peers has a higher weight than peers of those
individuals with many peers. For example, peers of farmers who name five
peers each have a weight of 0.2, whereas peers of farmers who list only two
peers each have a weight of 0.5. This assumption follows directly from the
concept of Bonacich centrality which suggests that each connection becomes
more powerful when there are fewer connections in a network.8
Third, in the absence of random assignments of peers into groups (Sacer-
dote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003), I argue that peer networks in my setting are
formed exogenously. I find that exogenous and time-invariant characteris-
tics, namely caste and geographical proximity, are good predictors of peers.
Of course, it is likely that peer networks are influenced by other common
8Bonacich (1987) argues that the extent to which an individual’s action is likely to
affect others’ action depends on that individual’s number of connections within a network
and the number of connections that other individuals in the network have. An implication
of this concept is that an individual whose outcome is affected by a greater number of
people would receive fewer weights from each person in that individual’s local network.
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unobserved characteristics. I test for this possibility and find that observed
exogenous characteristics namely caste and geography are good predictors of
peers.
Finally, self-reported peers are unique for every household by construction
and as a result I cannot assign a dummy variable for each household to
account for any correlated effects specific to each set of peers, but I include a
fixed effect for each social network, which is defined as the full peer network
within a village. Due to this restriction, I must assume that any correlated
effects associated with each peer group are captured by farmers’ observed
characteristics and by those of farmers’ peers, or are common across the
social network as a whole. If this assumption does not hold, unobserved
correlated effects might still be present in the estimate of the endogenous
peer effects.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Main Results
The estimation results in Table 2.2 illustrate OLS and generalized 2SLS
models with robust standard errors. Point estimates of endogenous peer
effects are 0.133 (OLS) and 0.814 (2SLS), both statistically significant. I
also estimate both models with network fixed effects. Point estimates for
endogenous effects in the OLS and 2SLS models when controlling for network
fixed effects are -0.104, which is not significantly different from zero, and
0.594, which is significant. The point estimates of the endogenous peer effects
indicate that a percentage increase in average cash crop revenue of peers is
correlated with an increase in a household’s cash crop revenue of 0.594% and
0.814% according to the 2SLS models with and without network-level fixed
effects (Table 2.2, Columns (4) and (2)).
Farmers’ and peers’ observed attributes are significantly associated with
cash crop revenues. The larger the land area a household allocates to growing
cash crops, the more livestock a household owns, and the larger the total land
holdings, the higher the household’s revenue from selling cash crops. On the
other hand, the more land allocated by peers to grow cash crops and the
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greater peers’ total land, the lower a farmer’s cash crop revenue.9
One important issue that arises from the estimation of peer effects is the
test statistics associated with generalized 2SLS estimation. When estimat-
ing peer effects without controlling for network-specific characteristics (Table
2.2, Column (2)), the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic, which indicates the
strength of the instruments, is 7.911. This result is associated with 20%
- 25% maximal instrumental variable relative bias according to the Stock-
Yogo critical values, which provide the threshold for the corresponding level
of relative bias from estimates. An implication of this regression is that the
construction of the linear-in-means model can lead to biased estimates due
to weak instruments with a small sample size.10 However, such bias could
be mitigated by estimating 2SLS model and controlling for network-specific
characteristics (Table 2.2, Column (4)). This specification improves the ex-
planatory power of the instrument set significantly. The Kleibergen-Paap
Wald F statistic is 10.529, and the relative bias lowers to only between 5%-
10%. In both models, the p-values of the Hansen J statistics (which reports
the likelihood of overidentification) are 0.583 and 0.111, which indicate that
the instrument set does not overidentify the endogenous social effect.
To assess whether peers’ outcomes or peers’ attributes are associated with
farmers’ outcomes, I test for the joint significance among the coefficient es-
timates of peers’ outcomes. For cash crop revenue, I find that both peers’
outcomes and peers’ observed attributes are associated with farmers’ own
outcomes.
The first-stage predicted average cash crop revenue of peers is presented
in Table A.2 in Appendix A.2. The regression results show that almost
all instruments except the number of family members aged 15-60 when not
9The inclusion of both farmers’ and their peers’ characteristics in the same regressions
might lead to multicollinearity. I test for variation within factor (VIF) for all specifications
and detect that no variable has VIF over 15. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a
major problem. For a farmer’s own characteristics, significant determinants that associate
with higher cash crop revenue include area cultivated, livestock holding, elevation and
slope. Farmers who allocate more land area to grow cash crop and own more livestock
tend to earn higher revenue from their cash crops. Plots that are located at a higher
elevation tend to be larger in size, and plots of higher slope are less favorable for growing
crops.
10This is an issue that does not get discussed in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), so it is unclear
whether their estimation results would also suffer from this issue. The sample size in
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) from the Add-Health data is 55,208, while there are only 509
households in this study.
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controlling for network-specific characteristics and total land ownership have
statistically strong explanatory power for the average revenue of peers, a
measure of the endogenous social effect. The statistical significance of the
instruments helps guarantee that the first-stage regressions can accurately
predict the endogenous social effect.
I next ask whether these peer effects in cash crop revenue are specific to a
single crop or exist across all three main cash crops in the area. I construct
a measure of revenue per crop by dividing the total revenue of that crop
(in rupees) by the land area allocated to that crop (bhiga). In Table 2.3,
I estimate peer effects separately for each crop and observe significant peer
effects for peas (0.846, Column (3)) and kidney beans (0.683, Column (1)),
but not for potatoes (Column (2)).
The marketing of potatoes is subject to idiosyncratic price shocks and stor-
age losses throughout the year. In another study by Mitra et al. (2013), the
authors find that providing price information from nearby wholesale markets
for potatoes does not reduce trader margins among potato farmers in West
Bengal, India. I think it is also plausible that in my setting farmers face
similar constraints when selling their potatoes. While it may be true that
uncertainties in marketing potatoes requires significant of information, the
information about marketing decisions shared among peers might not be very
effective. One possible reason I obtained from field work is that potatoes are
susceptible to occasional blight infestation and wildlife attack, which may be
locationally-specific to a particular farmer’s plots and may not be mitigated
by information from peers. Thus, finding no peer effects on revenue per land
unit for potatoes is not surprising.
2.6 Mechanisms
2.6.1 Possible Mechanisms
Input Expenditures
I find positive peer effects on cash crop revenues. What are the channels
through which peer effects operate in this context? One area where I expect
to see significant peer effects is the use of farm inputs. Other areas include
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land use, price information, marketing strategies and production technolo-
gies.
Table 2.4 presents the regression results for three dependent variables: to-
tal expenditures on farm inputs, fertilizer expenditures alone and on pesticide
expenditures alone.11 I observe significant peer effects on total farm input
expenditures and on pesticide expenditures, but not on fertilizer expendi-
tures. The absence of significant peer effects on fertilizer use might be due
to the low rate of fertilizer use among farmers overall. Duflo et al. (2008)
document a low rate of adoption of fertilizer for maize farmers in Kenya even
though the returns to fertilizer use can be substantial. In a related study,
Duflo et al. (2011) find no significant peer effects of fertilizer use among these
farmers, unless they had been to a fertilizer application trial conducted by
an extension agent. In my setting, there is a low rate of fertilizer use among
Thaltukhod farmers and I think the low rate of fertilizer use may explain
why I do not observe peer effects on fertilizer use.12
Pesticide use can be dependent on exogenous production shocks such as
pest or blight, which could vary from year to year. Pesticide investments
among farmers in any given year is therefore somewhat unpredictable. As a
result, farmers may need to consult with peers for information and advice.
Overall, I observe that the effects of peers in input expenditures are stronger
(0.803 for aggregate inputs and 0.799 for pesticide, see Table 2.4, Columns (1)
and (3)) than peer effects in cash crop revenue (0.594, see Table 2.2, Column
(4)). Given that pesticide use may be driven by spatially-correlated pest
outbreaks, I test whether my observed peer effects persist if I define peers as
the nearest five neighbors. When I define peers by geographic proximity, I do
not observe peer effects in pesticide use (or in fertilizer or input use overall).
Land Allocation to Cash Crops
In Table 2.5, I present two additional mechanism tests underlying peer effects
on cash crop revenue.
I report peer effects estimates on land area allocated to growing cash crops.
11Approximately 33% of total aggregate input expenditures are on fertilizer and 5% are
on pesticide in my data.
12About half of the farmers in my sample use are in the first quartile of fertilizer expen-
ditures.
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I observe significant peer effects only for peas (0.910) but not for kidney
beans or potatoes (Column (3)). Given that kidney beans and potatoes are
established crops in the area, this result is not surprising. Conley and Udry
(2010) also find similar results where significant peer effects are evident only
in a new crop, but not in established crops.
Being a relatively new crop in the region, I suspect that farmers may still be
learning about the proper cultivation of peas.13 Information about the new
production process and marketing decisions might be shared among peers. In
addition, peas are highly perishable, and need to be delivered to the market
at the right time to receive a good price. So, farmers might benefit from
strategic marketing information to secure a high price for their peas.
Back-of-the-envelope Calculations
To provide numerical approximations of how much of the variation in farm-
ers’ cash crop revenues is explained by peer effects, I estimate the value of
peer effects for each component of revenue and compare that to the value
of peer effects for revenue as a whole. Specifically, I multiply the point es-
timate of endogenous peer effects on cash crop revenue (0.594, Table 2.2,
Column (4)) with the average cash crop revenue among Thaltukhod farmers
(9,341 rupees), which is 5,548 rupees.14 Similarly, I multiply the point esti-
mate of endogenous peer effects on farm input expenditures (0.803, Table 2.4
Column (1)) with the average farm input expenditures among Thaltukhod
farmers (2,634 rupees), which is 2,110 rupees. In terms of peer effects on
land allocation for growing cash crops, I calculate the average effect of land
allocation on revenue by multiplying the average cash crop revenue per land
unit (577.89 and 1,154.92 rupees per bhiga), the average land area allocated
to growing each cash crop (1.308 and 1.626 bhiga), and its point estimates of
endogenous peer effects (0.683 and 0.846, Table 2.3, Columns (1) and (3)).15
The average peer effects from land allocation on cash crop revenue is approx-
13About 53% of the farmers in Thaltukhod grow peas in 2008 when the survey was
conducted. Peas were introduced and adopted rapidly in the area and the share of farmers
growing peas increased only slightly during the past few years preceding the survey.
14The average GDP per capita in Himachal Pradesh in 2008 was 33,963 rupees (Planning
Commission of India).
15In order to make a strong case for this argument, I only calculate the average effects
for kidney beans and peas since the coefficient estimate of the endogenous effect for the
productivity of potato cultivation is not significant.
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imately 2,105 rupees. Note that this figure is an upper bound since I have
not accounted for any opportunity cost associated with using cultivated land
for cash crops.
Overall, these calculations imply that peer effects on input expenditures
and land allocation can explain 75% of the peer effects on cash crop revenue
at the maximum. Therefore, at least 25% of farmers’ cash crop revenue is
left unexplained according to my results. Combining the two average effects
of farm input expenditures and land allocation, I still observe a considerable
difference between farmers’ cash crop revenues and combined effects of input
expenditures and land allocation of about 1,333 rupees. Readers may wish
to attribute this additional portion of revenue to the returns to input use.
However, the implied rate of returns to input use of 63 % appears to be
quite high in my context, given that in a similar study, returns to inputs
have been estimated to be approximately 36 % (Duflo et al., 2008). Instead,
I suspect that the remaining portion of cash crop revenue unexplained by
input expenditures and land allocation could be attributed to management,
negotiation and marketing skills.
2.6.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, I check for a number of possible confounding factors that may
bias my results. First, peers may be matched on similar observed attributes
where these attributes drive revenue and the correlation of attributes mimics
peer effects. I rule out this possibility by testing for the correlations between
farmers’ and their peers’ observed attributes. Second, individual unobserved
characteristics among the very high and the very low earning farmers may
generate similar observed outcomes among peers and drive the estimated
peer effects. I exclude the highest 10 % and the lowest 10 % in terms of
cash crop revenue from my sample and re-run the main specification. Third,
economies of scale and scope may resemble peer effects. I test for these
two mechanisms by checking for correlations between peers for evidence of
economies of scale and scope. Fourth, I am concerned that the peer effects
estimates may be picking up the effects of geographical proximity, so I re-
run the main specification again by defining peers as nearest geographical
neighbors. And finally, I test for a number of other unobserved characteristics
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that may still drive my results.
Correlated Effects
My analysis cannot control for unobserved correlated effects within each net-
work. One concern might be that farmers would choose to associate with
other farmers who share similar observed attributes. Such attributes likely in-
clude land ownership, livestock ownership and labor supply (family members
aged 15-60). I perform pair-wise correlation tests which include network-level
fixed effects for all three attributes of interest. I find that farmers’ attributes
are not strongly correlated with the attributes of their peers, suggesting that
farmers do not self-select to become peers based on land ownership, livestock
or the number of family members in the working age.
Individual Unobserved Characteristics
Table 2.6 presents the robustness checks of the peer effects estimates. While
observed characteristics do not fully explain the results, individual unob-
served characteristics could drive the relationship I find between peer effects
and economic outcomes. If endogenous peer effects (either social learning
or social influence) are a linear combination of exogenous and correlated ef-
fects, they create a problem for identifying endogenous peer effects (Manski,
1993). Bandiera and Rasul (2006) document an inverted-U relationship be-
tween network characteristics and farmers’ adoption patterns. In my setting,
I am concerned that there exists a similar inverted-U relationship driven by
an unobserved household attribute (ability) that is linearly correlated with
network characteristics but non-linearly correlated with cash crop revenues.
For example, this might result if farmers with particularly low revenue tend
to be peers with other farmers with particularly low revenue, and particularly
high revenue farmers choose to have peers with others of high revenue.
The unobserved attribute may generate similar observed correlated out-
comes among farmers whose cash crop revenues are very high and very low
due to outside options and marketing constraints spuriously and mimic peer
effects (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson, 2012).
To test for this possibility, I drop farmers are in the highest and the lowest
deciles of cash crop revenue within each village (Column (1)). I still observe
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significant peer effects on cash crop revenue with a slightly higher magnitude
(0.708) when compared with the main specification (0.594).
Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope
Economies of scale and scope are two other possible channels that may imi-
tate peer effects. By banding together, farmers may increase their scale and
scope, and therefore increase returns. If economies of scale are present, I
would expect to find them within farms as well as between farms, implying
that farmers with more land allocated to cash crops should be able to cap-
ture higher revenues per unit. To mimic peer effects, farmers with larger
cash crops scales must also be peers with similar large-scale farmers. I do
not observe significant peer effects in land allocation to cash crops nor be-
tween revenue per acre and the land allocated to cash crops, indicating that
economies of scale do not appear to drive my results. Since I do not observe
significant correlations, I see no evidence of economies of scale in my setting,
implying that this effect is likely not driving my results.
If I observe a correlation between the number of cash crops grown and
revenue of land per unit, economies of scope may exist and be correlated
with higher revenues. For these to drive the peer effect results, the number
of cash crops grown would need to also be correlated among peers. I observe
significant correlations between both relationships. Therefore, I cannot rule
out the possibility that economies of scope drive my results. The significance
of these two relationships are not surprising in my setting given that I find
strong evidence of peer effects of adoption of a new crop (peas) among peer
farmers. Further, I also observe that farmers who adopted peas earn higher
cash crop revenues on average. While this finding suggests that peers might
have been formed due to the adoption of a new crop, I think it is unlikely
because in my data I have already observed that peers are formed largely by
exogenous characteristics namely caste and geographical proximity.
Proximity Effects
One possible concern is that observed peer effects on cash crop revenue could
be largely driven by geographical proximity and spatially-correlated unob-
served characteristics. For example, Schmit and Rounsevell (2006) find that
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after controlling for detailed geographic attributes, imitation patterns be-
tween neighboring farmers might not always happen. To test for this con-
cern, I alter the definition of peers to be the five nearest neighbors based
on geographical distance derived from GPS coordinates, which is the same
approach used in Helmers and Patnam (2014). I test for the overlap between
the members in a farmer’s peer group and a farmer’s five nearest geographic
peers within the same network.16 I use this geographic peer group to re-run
the main specification and present the results in Table 2.6 Column (2). I
do not find significant endogenous peer effects from geographical proximate
peers.
In the rugged terrain of Himachal Pradesh, Euclidean distance may not
imply proximity or accessibility between neighbors due to differences in ele-
vation. For each of the household’s five nearest geographical neighbors, I also
use the inverse of the difference in elevation (in meters) of a household and
its neighbors as an alternate definition of peers. I row-normalize the weights
matrix so that it is comparable to other weights matrices used in this study.
I do not find significant peer effects in this specification (Table 2.6 Column
(3)). These two results help to confirm that the peer effects I have identified
are not mainly driven by geographical proximity, both by distance and by
elevation.
Other Confounding Factors
A number of other confounding factors may still drive my results. First, the
survey is top-coded for some farmers and therefore might omit a number of
social links that households did not get to report. The issue of top-coding
could lead to biased estimates of peer effects due to missing information
about social ties (Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011). For example, Fafchamps
and Gubert (2007) report substantial loss of information of personal links
from top-coding. In my dataset, this is not a major concern since more than
half of the households reported only a few links per category in the pre-
survey qualitative interviews conducted before the survey was administered.
However, to deal with the possibility that top-coding might be a problem,
16I test for the correlation between the two sets of peers and report the correlation of
0.183. This suggests that there is only a small overlap between self-reported peers and
geographic peers among Thaltukhod farmers.
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in all the specifications I row-normalize the interaction matrix G. Further,
as a robustness check I restrict the sample to only households who reported
to have only two peers that they consulted for general advice, which consists
of 45% of all the households. The results report evidence of significant peer
effects, but the magnitude is smaller than that of the specification with the
full set of peers (Table A.3 in Appendix A.2). Results suggest that top-coding
is not a serious concern in this study.17
Regarding additional robustness checks, I control for other factors related
to geography, off-farm opportunities and agricultural extension (unreported,
but available upon request). For geography, I control for the distance to the
nearest main trading location, elevation and slope of agricultural plots. For
off-farm opportunities, I control for the distance to the nearest public bus
stop and the interaction term between this distance and the number of family
members in the household aged 15-60. Finally, I test whether the household
has ever been in contact with an extension agent during the past 12 months
and the frequency of interactions with the agent. I find that all of these
factors are not significant and thus do not drive the significant and positive
peer effects.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Caste Network
In this section, I explore alternate definitions of peers that might help explain
the observed peer effects. The first is the role of caste networks. In rural In-
dia, caste is essential in the daily activities of small-scale households. Caste
represents a social structure in the society, functions as a social safety net and
performs as a risk-sharing unit for idiosyncratic shocks. While individuals
can benefit greatly from interacting with others within their own caste, the
hierarchical structure of the caste system may limit some individuals from
17Another concern is that the instrument set, friends of friends’ attributes G2x, could
contain farmers’ own information. This would be the case if an individual that Farmer
A listed as a peer also listed Farmer A as a friend. I replace the instrument set G2x
with the observed attributes of friends of friends of friends, G3x (one further degree of
separation). I re-run all the specifications again with G3x as the instrument set. Results
remain positive and significant (unreported, but available upon request).
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interacting with other individuals beyond their caste networks (Kandpal and
Baylis, 2012). Recent findings illustrate that caste networks act as the ref-
erence unit for risk-sharing in migration decisions (Munshi and Rosenzweig,
2006), consumption behavior (Morduch, 2004; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012),
new crop adoption (Munasib and Roy, 2012) and demand for insurance (Mo-
barak and Rosenzweig, 2013). In my setting, earning higher revenues might
not only be desirable for an individual farmer, but also beneficial for other
farmers within the same caste. This is because the additional revenue can be
used as resource in risk-sharing mechanisms against unforeseen circumstances
including severe weather, medical sickness and crop losses.
I use networks based exclusively on caste among individuals within the
same village and in neighboring villages. There are only two main castes in
the area: rajput (high caste) and harijan (low caste). In my caste network
estimations, I assume that any correlated effects are different between the
two castes, but are similar within the same caste. This assumption seems
to be realistic given the strong segregation between people of different castes
for religious events and social gatherings in rural India. Also, in my data,
peers with whom households report to receive advice from most often usually
belong to the same caste. In Table 2.7, Panel A, I re-run the main specifica-
tion but with two weights matrices, one based on self-reported peers and the
other based on caste within the same village.18 Both weights matrices are
row-normalized to make the coefficients comparable. I find that the coeffi-
cient estimates for endogenous peer effects of both self-reported peers (0.519)
and caste-based peers (0.047) are both positive and significant.19 However,
the magnitude is much smaller for that of caste-based peers. Thus, while
farmers’ outcomes are associated with those of fellow villagers within the
same caste, they are even more associated with those of their self-reported
peers.
I also test whether caste networks beyond the village boundary underlie
my results. In Panel B, using caste networks in the two nearest neighbor-
ing villages and self-reported peers (within the village), I find evidence of
significant endogenous peer effects among self-reported peers but not among
18I cannot include the caste dummy variable as a regressor for all regressions in this
section due to collinearity.
19Although the point estimate for self-reported peers is not significant at the 0.1 level,
they are still significant at the 0.15 level.
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caste-based peers in most specifications. In a few specifications, neighboring
village peers of the same caste had small and marginally significant effects.
My results show that only same-caste peers within the same village have con-
sistent, but small, peer effects. These results are not surprising since first,
I observe little contact outside of the village (about only five times on aver-
age in the past 12 months preceding the survey), and self-reported peers are
those who farmers considered to be their main advisors. Further, they help
confirm that my prior results self-reported peers are individuals who most
associated with farmers’ cash crop revenues.
2.7.2 “Lead-farmer” Model
In this section, I test for the “lead-farmer” model. Specifically, I test for
the possibility that high-performing farmers in each village may drive the
outcomes of other farmers in the same village. I use eigenvector centrality
as a measure of “lead-farmer” in my assessment. By definition, farmers
with high eigenvector scores are those who are listed as sources of advice for
several farmers, and where the people listing them are also sources of advice
for many. As a result, they are more likely to facilitate learning or impose
influence on other farmers. I find a significant correlation between higher
eigenvector centrality score and higher cash crop revenues for farmers within
the same village. Thus, farmers with higher revenues are more influential
within their peer network, and I am concerned that their effect is beyond the
peer groups to other members of the village as a whole. Therefore, I run the
main specification while controlling for the average revenues of the top ten
percent of farmers within the village. The coefficient estimate for the revenues
for the top decile within each village is not significant, implying that while
high earning farmers may have higher influence within their peer groups, such
effect does not extend outside their sets of peers. I also test this hypothesis
among the highest revenue quintile and quartile and the point estimates are
not significant in these other two specifications. These results indicate that
the “lead-farmer” model does not drive my estimates of endogenous peer
effects.
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2.7.3 Alternate Definitions of Peers
It may be possible that my construction of the weights matrix to estimate
peer effects on cash crop revenue might be contingent on the definition of
peers in the survey. The weights matrix G used in the main specification
takes the union of both peers that a household consults in general and on
agricultural matters. As an alternate specification, I split the two types of
peers and estimate their effects separately.20 If peers truly help facilitate
information flow to improve cash crop revenues, I would expect the strongest
peer effects among those peers to who farmers mainly look to for advice on
cash crop production.
In Table 2.8, I estimate the main specification again separately for each
peer group. Peer effects on cash crop revenue remain significant. Specifically,
the point estimate for endogenous peer effects on the revenues of the two peers
consulted about agricultural matters (0.774, Column (2)) is higher than the
peer effects on the revenues of the three peers consulted about general matters
(0.581, Column(1)). Thus, when I restrict the sample only to peers listed as
main advisors of agricultural matters, I observe a higher point estimate of
peer effects. The result suggests that peer effects are likely transmitted more
strongly through agricultural peers than through general peers.
2.7.4 Caveats
While I have conducted several robustness checks to ensure that peer effects
are not largely driven by other factors, I cannot completely identify peer
effects due to the endogeneity of peer networks. In the absence of a panel
dataset, I assume that network-level unobserved characteristics are time-
invariant. I do not have information about how often peers interact across
networks, also absent from most other peer effects studies. Moreover, I also
cannot fully rule out the possibility that farmers might have other important
links in their peer group but did not get to list them in the data collection
process. For example, this last piece of information might be useful in esti-
mating the threshold effect of social networks in network size and peer effects
(Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson, 2012).
20Approximately 25% of the households report that peers who they seek advice from
most frequently for general matters are also peers who they seek advice from most fre-
quently particularly for agriculture.
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It is possible that other factors related to individual unobserved character-
istics can drive peer effects on cash crop revenue. For example, some farmers
may earn higher revenue because they are more gregarious than others, and
more gregarious farmers themselves tend to have more gregarious friends. I
cannot rule out this hypothesis from the results in this study. Although in
as much as soil productivity is spatially correlated (both by distance and
elevation), I can rule out that common soil quality drives my results. I also
do not have accurate measure of access to credit, storage facilities and mar-
keting constraints of farmers in the area, which are likely related to cash crop
revenue.
2.8 Relevance to Rural Development Policy
From my results, I observe significant peer effects in certain crops and in-
put use, which may indicate that peers may only be effective channels of
information diffusion among farmers in some circumstances but not in oth-
ers. Specifically, I observe strong peer effects in both the amount of land
allocated to a new crop (peas) and the revenue per acre of that same crop,
implying that peers can help facilitate new crop adoption and improve the
benefits from that adoption (similar results on peer effects and crop and tech-
nology adoption are found by Munshi (2004) and Conley and Udry (2010),
among others). Conversely, I find little evidence of peer effects in returns
from existing and highly variable crops (potatoes) or in the use of fertilizer,
implying that some technologies may be either too idiosyncratic or complex
for peer effects to play a role (Mancini et al., 2007; Duflo et al., 2011).
Where they exist, peer effects are not unambiguously beneficial. While
they help those farmers with highly productive peers earn higher revenues,
they may leave farmers with less productive peers with low returns. Exist-
ing extension models that rely on peers to disseminate information among
farmers may not be as effective if they do not take these limitations of peer
effects into account. I hope my results can provide some insight into to what
extent peers can facilitate information flows and technology adoption among
farmers.
The farm field school (FFS) program is a classic example of an extension
model designed to take advantage of social relationships among peer farmers
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(Birkhaeuser et al., 1991; Gautam and Anderson, 2000). While intuitively
promising, a recent systematic review published by the International Ini-
tiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) on FFS programs from several countries
find no significant evidence of information spillovers from farmers who receive
extension efforts to those who do not (Waddington et al., 2014). Existing
evidence indicates that the difference in outcomes of extension efforts us-
ing the FFS approach may be attributed to differential social relationships
among farmers within the same community. For instance, strong kinship ties
among Filipino rice farmers foster the adoption of integrated pest manage-
ment (IPM) technology (Palis, 2006). On the other hand, low social cohesion
among farmers in Cameroon may limit the exchange of knowledge and in-
formation (David, 2007). In our work, we find that peer effects are largely
limited to within-village effects, implying that strong and frequent social ties
are needed for information to flow.
While finding significant peer effects is evocative, it might raise concerns
among policy makers whether the information introduced by extension efforts
may only be limited to farmers in social networks with access to extension
agents. Existing research suggests that peer effects may be effective only
in some agricultural extension settings and not the others. For instance,
Feder and Savastano (2006) note that a notable difference in socio-economic
status between farmers in Indonesia who participate in FFS and those who do
not participate, preventing the diffusion of information. This evidence may
also be important for the context of India where social segregation within
the caste networks is common. Other studies from Bangladesh, China, and
Pakistan find evidence of diffusion of information among farmers about a
new technology, but the diffusion is only observable in the short run (Ricker-
Gilbert et al., 2008; Pananurak, 2010; Wu, 2010).
Our results point to a number of areas ripe for future research. First, it
would be helpful for policy makers to understand the mechanism of infor-
mation diffusion among farmers before relying solely on having peers share
knowledge and information. Understanding of how knowledge and informa-
tion may be transmitted within a network can facilitate extension efforts.
With regards to the diffusion of information among peers, the demography
literature has provided at least two possible mechanisms (Montgomery and
Casterline, 1996; Munshi and Myaux, 2006). Social learning occurs when
individuals obtain information from interpersonal interactions about prices,
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qualities, or anticipated consequences which eventually lead to observed out-
comes (Kohler et al., 2001). A second channel is social influence where
interpersonal interactions in the context of different social structures includ-
ing family, cultural, and religious settings may shape individuals’ decision-
making, and hence their outcomes (Akerlof, 1980; Behrman et al., 2002).
Understanding which channel is most important for the specific technology
or information being promoted, and how peer effects facilitate that channel
is important for being able to make use of peers.
In our setting, we found that peer effects are largely constrained to be in
a small set of close peers, not in multi-village caste networks. Understand-
ing what types of information flow easily within close networks and which
are more amenable to larger networks would be again helpful for designing
agricultural extension programs that make the most use of existing social
networks (Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1992).
Last, we find evidence that our observed peer effects in terms of revenue
are not explained by peer effects on input use and land allocation, implying
that peer effects also may exist in the price received. This finding points to
the need for future work to better understand how peers can affect marketing,
bargaining and prices, as opposed to the current focus which is largely on
agricultural production (exceptions include Michelson (2015) and Songserm-
sawas et al. (2015)).
2.9 Conclusion
Farmers in developing countries face multiple constraints in agricultural pro-
duction and marketing. Existing studies have documented that access to reli-
able information is one major constraint, and peers may be effective channels
to help facilitate social diffusion of information.
My results identify strong peer effects on cash crop revenue. Farmers are
more likely to earn higher revenues from selling cash crops if their peers earn
more from cash crops. I also find evidence of peer effects in the cultivation
of a recently introduced cash crops but no effect on established crops. I
investigate the possible mechanisms through which peer effects might be
transmitted. I find evidence of possible mechanisms through increased input
expenditure and greater allocation of land to growing a new cash crop similar
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to early studies by Conley and Udry (2010) and Munshi (2004). I identify
positive peer effects on farm input expenditures, especially for pesticides, but
not fertilizer. While the results indicate evidence of significant peer effects,
my back-of-the-envelope calculations demonstrate that peer effects through
input expenditures and crop land allocation are unlikely to fully explain the
variation in revenue among peers. Other mechanisms that may help explain
improved cash crop revenue among peers include management, negotiation
and marketing skills, although I cannot directly test for these mechanisms in
this study.
I account for different aspects of social networks using various definitions
of peers. I observe significant peer effects using caste networks defined only
within and but not beyond the village boundary. However, the magnitude of
the coefficient estimate is not as high as that of self-reported peers, suggesting
that self-reported peers are most associated with farmers’ cash crop revenue
in my setting. Further, I find no significant peer effects on cash crop revenue
based on geographical proximity. Finally, I find peer effects to be stronger
for self-reported agricultural peers than general peers.
My study has at least three policy-relevant implications for agricultural
extension in developing countries. First, while a number of studies have
highlighted significant peer effects on technological adoption in agriculture,
my study helps motivate future research on peer effects beyond agricultural
production. My results show that peers may be associated with management
and marketing decisions. However, agricultural policies relying on peer net-
works to disseminate information may be more beneficial to farmers only for
some crops rather than others, depending on the nature of the crop itself.
For example, large idiosyncratic shocks and high uncertainty in the market-
ing potatoes might prevent sharing of information between peers from being
effective.
Second, in contrast to previous peer effects studies conducted on a ho-
mogeneous landscape (Conley and Udry, 2010; Helmers and Patnam, 2014),
I do not observe significant peer effects from geographic proximate peers.
This result suggests that proximity may not always be a good proxy for peer
networks. This is particularly important for my setting. Since I cannot di-
rectly control for the heterogeneous landscape like that of Thaltukhod Valley,
I therefore have to interpret results with caution and be especially careful
when comparing my results and suggest any policy implications without con-
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sidering the nature of the landscape.
My results also motivate more rigorous research on the mechanisms through
which peer effects operate. While I find significant peer effects from both self-
reported peers and caste-based peers, the policy implications from either type
of networks may be very different. If social influence is the dominant diffusion
mechanism, introducing influential individuals within a network might be
sufficient to disseminate information given the scarce resources of extension
services in developing countries. However, if the true diffusion mechanism is
social learning, extension service agents might need to introduce the infor-
mation to several individuals within a network to ensure a broader coverage
to increase information accessibility among peers. My results show that peer
effects are stronger among self-reported peers than caste-based peers, sug-
gesting that information may not always be easily accessible to all farmers
within a network if they do not belong to the specific peer group which is
exposed to extension efforts. This implies that to allow peer effects help
improve cash crop revenue in my context, providing information to many
farmers within a network may be necessary.
With regards to agricultural policy in developing countries, particularly
extension services, it may seem reasonable to leverage peer networks and to
design programs which provide new information to a small number of farm-
ers, anticipating that information will diffuse through the networks. How-
ever, my results show that the diffusion of information will depend on the
network structure and the type of information. Specifically, I observe that
the relatively complex information surrounding improved agricultural rev-
enue is largely transmitted within village between close peers, and does not
transmit as well through weaker connections such as more distant villagers of
the same caste. Thus, relying on peer-based diffusion to communicate with
farmers may need to be considered with caution.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Var. N Mean SD Min. Max.
Family size (count) 509 5.72 2.35 1 17
Family members 0-14 yr. (count) 509 1.76 1.53 0 8
Family members 15-60 yr. (count) 509 3.61 1.80 0 10
Family members above 60 yr. (count) 509 0.35 0.63 0 3
Caste (=1 if high caste) 509 0.85 0.36 0 1
Land holding (bhiga) 509 8.19 6.13 0.5 50
Cash crop land (% of total land) 509 0.51 0.18 0.148 1
Livestock ownership (units) 509 0.58 1.01 0 13
Cash crop revenue (rupees) 509 9341.65 7372.29 500 95400
Cash input expenditure (rupees) 509 2634.46 2193.252 200 31200
Fertilizer expenditure (rupees) 509 683.30 729.86 0 15000
Pesticide expenditure (rupees) 509 194.40 461.21 0 8000
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Table 2.2: Peer Effects Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Endogenous peer effects
Endogenous effect 0.133∗ 0.814∗∗ -0.104 0.594∗∗
(0.075) (0.316) (0.089) (0.286)
Own characteristics
Proportion of cash crop land 0.688∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 0.548∗ 0.824∗∗
(0.239) (0.323) (0.289) (0.339)
Livestock 0.091∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(0.036) (0.033) (0.045) (0.035)
Family members 15-60 years 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.012
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Caste 0.005 0.003 0.029 0.026
(0.185) (0.235) (0.177) (0.211)
Total land holding 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Exogenous social effects
Proportion of cash crop land -0.046 -0.879∗ 0.456 -0.393
(0.252) (0.470) (0.296) (0.453)
Livestock 0.069∗∗ -0.110 0.119∗∗∗ -0.061
(0.033) (0.091) (0.040) (0.084)
Family members 15-60 years -0.020 -0.026 -0.019 -0.021
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023)
Caste 0.541∗∗∗ 0.159 0.669∗∗∗ 0.337
(0.191) (0.319) (0.189) (0.278)
Total land holding -0.011∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.036∗∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.006) (0.017)
Network FE - - Yes Yes
Test statistics
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic - 7.911 - 10.529
Hansen J statistic - 0.301 - 6.006
Hansen p-value - 0.583 - 0.111
Observations 509 509 509 509
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Peer Effects Estimates: Another Specification
(1) (2) (3)
Kidney Beans Potatoes Peas
Revenue per land unit
Endogenous effect 0.683∗∗∗ -0.625 0.846∗
(0.113) (0.619) (0.456)
Network FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 509 509 509
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mechanisms that
may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop revenue. All specifications
in this table are estimated using 2SLS approach with the same set of control
variables in the main specification: proportion of cash crop land, livestock
ownership, family members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.4: Possible Mechanisms: Peer Effects Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Farm Inputs Fertilizer Pesticide
Endogenous peer effects
Endogenous effect 0.803∗∗ -0.430 0.799∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.183) (0.192)
Network FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 509 509 509
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mech-
anisms that may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop
revenue. All specifications in this table are estimated using 2SLS
approach with the same set of control variables in the main speci-
fication: proportion of cash crop land, livestock ownership, family
members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
35
Table 2.5: Possible Mechanisms: Peer Effects Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Kidney Beans Potatoes Peas
Land allocation to cash crop production
Endogenous effect 0.740 0.895 0.910∗
(0.484) (0.734) (0.287)
Network FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 509 509 509
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mechanisms that
may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop revenue. All specifications
in this table are estimated using 2SLS approach with the same set of control
variables in the main specification: proportion of cash crop land, livestock
ownership, family members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.6: Robustness Checks: Peer Effects Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Individ. Unobs. Near Neighbors Elev. Diff.
Endogenous peer effects
Endogenous effect 0.708∗∗ 0.375 0.542
(0.322) (0.275) (0.346)
Network FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 509 509
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mechanisms that
may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop revenue. All specifications
in this table are estimated using 2SLS approach with the same set of control
variables in the main specification: proportion of cash crop land, livestock
ownership, family members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Caste Network: Peer Effects Estimates
(1)
Revenue
A. Same caste only within village
Self-reported peers 0.519+
(0.351)
Caste-based peers 0.047∗
(0.027)
B. Same caste only in two neighboring villages
Self-reported peers 0.814∗∗
(0.393)
Caste-based peers -0.013
(0.045)
Observations 509
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mechanisms that
may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop revenue. All specifications
in this table are estimated using 2SLS approach with the same set of control
variables in the main specification except caste: proportion of cash crop land,
livestock ownership, family members aged 15-60 and total land holding. Self-
reported peers are only contained within the village.
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8: Alternate Definition of Peers: Peer Effects Estimates
(1) (2)
Gen. Peers Ag. Peers
Endogenous peer effects
Endogenous effect 0.581∗ 0.774∗
(0.346) (0.423)
Network FE Yes Yes
Observations 508 508
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mechanisms that
may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop revenue. All specifications
in this table are estimated using 2SLS approach with the same set of control
variables in the main specification: proportion of cash crop land, livestock
ownership, family members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1: Thaltukhod Valley, Himachal Pradesh, India
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Figure 2.2: Cash Crop Revenue Kernel.
Figure 2.3: Cash Crop Revenue Kernel across Villages.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECTS OF CREDIT AND MARKET
ACCESS ON FARM GATE PRICES IN
INDIA
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
Many farmers in the developing world face high market frictions and variable
crop prices when selling their crops. One indicator of high market frictions
is the large variation in prices received by farmers between regions, and over
each cultivation season. Regular seasonal price variation is a common feature
of staple grain markets in many parts of the world (Sahn et al., 1989). For
instance, Burke (2014) reports that maize prices in Kenya can vary up to
100% in the same market location within the same year. In a household
survey conducted in India, farmers in the same village who sell the same
crop receive prices that may vary up to as much as 100% within the same
month. In my setting, crop prices fluctuate significantly over time, with the
greatest level of dispersion observed right at harvest, when almost 70% of all
crop transactions in the data occur. Farmers are highly dependent on their
crop revenue, and even a small fluctuation in received crop prices can greatly
affect their household income, and thus welfare measures.
While some of the variation in crop prices farmers receive at the time of
sale may be attributed to spurious price fluctuations throughout the year, it
might also be explained by the heterogeneity in outside options for farmers,
and thus substantial variation in bargaining power.1 Farmers often face high
transportation costs, lack adequate price information, and cannot verify the
quality of their produce when trying to sell their crops (Goyal, 2010). All
of these obstacles may make them more dependent on village traders and
the prices they offer. As a result, farmers who have limited outside options
have little bargaining power, often resulting in low returns on their crops
1The summary statistics indicate that there is no significant change over time after
harvest in the average prices received by farmers across all the crops in my sample.
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(Bardhan, 1991; Clay, 2004).
In India, most farmers sell their crops to traders at their farm, who then
sell the crops to the government regulated markets or mandis. Nearby mar-
kets, where they exist, often close not long after harvest, reducing price in-
formation and increasing potential transactions costs, which may exacerbate
farmers’ dependence on traders (Mallory and Baylis, 2013).2 The Indian gov-
ernment sets seasonal minimum support prices (MSP) for farmers, which are
meant to be the minimum prices paid for crops of ‘fair quality.’ However, in
our data, approximately half of the transactions report sale prices below the
MSP levels. A substantial share of the transactions where prices are below
the MSP levels occur for paddy or wheat sales (76% and 47% of all paddy
and wheat transactions are below their MSP levels), which are subject to
heavy regulation by the government throughout the growing season.3 Thus,
even in these regulated markets, prices are highly variable, and farmers may
require bargaining power to receive better prices.
Lack of credit also constrains a farmer’s ability to take advantage of price
arbitrage opportunities. While credit may help farmers in Kenya arbitrage
prices over time (Burke, 2014), in India, farmers often obtain credit from
traders, and are expected to pay the trader back right at harvest, neces-
sitating a prompt sale (Mitra et al., 1986). This problem is compounded
by the fact that before borrowing for inputs for the next cropping season,
farmers have to pay off their past loan, again, necessitating sales at harvest.
Among the households who use credit in the sample, approximately 75% re-
ceive credit from informal sources. Thus, farmers are constrained by their
inability to arbitrage over time, over space or over buyers. In this study, I an-
alyze the extent to which increased access to credit and agricultural markets
allows farmers to receive higher crop prices.
To investigate how credit and market access affect farm gate prices, I use
data on monthly crop transactions reported in the longitudinal household
survey from the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid-
Tropics (ICRISAT). I geocode these data, and combine them with mar-
ket price information reported by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture, Ag-
2The Indian government issues license for agricultural traders to operate in mandis to
buy crops from farmers. Since there are only a small number of traders who are allowed
to operate in each market, traders tend to collude and offer low prices to farmers at the
time of sales.
3Of all 4,845 crop transactions in the data, 43 % are paddy and wheat transactions.
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MarkNet.4 I test two main hypotheses in this study. First, I explore the
extent to which access to agricultural credit helps farmers receive higher
prices for their crops. I limit the analysis to only major grains and oilseeds
cultivated in the villages in the sample. It is possible that the amount of loans
and crop prices farmers receive are correlated with common unobserved char-
acteristics. For example, farmers who are better negotiators may be able to
obtain credit more cheaply, and also receive better prices for their crops.
To account for this endogeneity problem, I exploit the plausibly exogenous
variation in state elections across India as a potential shock to the provision
of public agricultural credit. I observe an increase in public loans, and a
decrease in interest rates in the six months prior to a state election, which
allows me to compare states with and without elections as a shock to credit
from public sources.5 Second, to control for a farmer’s market access, I con-
sider the number of markets open for sales of any crop within a 50 kilometer
radius of each village in a given week using the geocoded market data from
AgMarkNet.
My results show that the increase in credit provision by public banks and
the reduction in interest rates increase the crop prices received by farmers.
Further, I find that greater access to nearby, open agricultural markets after
harvest also increases prices received by farmers, and increase the price effects
of improved credit access. I find that the increase in prices due to the credit
shock is specific to crops other than paddy and wheat. I note that paddy and
wheat prices and sales are highly regulated which may reduce potential for
arbitrage, even with credit. The magnitude of the effect of credit on prices
is highest among small farmers, who may have more limited outside options
to access credit compared to larger farmers. I show that my results are only
driven by the increase in public loans, not credit from other sources that
is less likely to be directly influenced by state elections. Further, I rule out
that my results are driven by other effects of elections, such as on agricultural
assistance programs or prices directly.
I make several contributions to the literature. First, this study comple-
ments the broad literature on the effects of credit on farm management and
4AgMarkNet is the website of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture
http://agmarknet.nic.in/.
5In my study, public banks include the State Bank of India and its associates, and
nationalized banks.
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agricultural marketing (De Janvry et al., 1991; Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000;
Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Barrett, 2007; Stephens and Barrett, 2011).
Existing evidence of the returns to credit provision are not conclusive. While
a number of studies find substantial returns to credit provision (de Mel et al.,
2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Blattman et al., 2013; Fafchamps et al.,
2014), other studies have found the magnitude of returns to credit to be much
more limited (Karlan et al., 2012; Berge et al., 2014; Karlan et al., 2014). In
addition, most studies have considered the effects of credit on agricultural
investments, farm management, and technological adoption, but only one to
my knowledge has studied the direct effects of credit on crop prices (Burke,
2014). Burke (2014) uses a randomized controlled trial to explore the effects
of credit on prices Kenyan farmers receive for their maize, and finds that
access to credit can help increase prices at farm gate. In this study, I extend
his work by using observational data along with the plausibly exogenous vari-
ation in credit access to ask not only whether farmers receive higher prices,
but which farmers are able to benefit, in conjunction with the role of market
access. While Burke (2014) uses a novel randomized experiment to study the
effect of credit on crop prices, my work uses observational data from eight
states India, which allows this work to capture substantial geographic and
household heterogeneity in our analysis.
Second, while existing studies have noted the effect of state elections on
credit provision from public sources, to my knowledge, ours is the first to
use elections as an instrument for access to credit using a household survey
containing detailed credit information. Third, I find that state elections do
not only affect the amount of public credit provided by public banks, but
also the interest rates offered by non-institutional financial sources.
Last, most prior literature emphasizes the role of geography and trans-
portation costs on market participation (Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin, 2001;
Muto and Yamano, 2009; Aggarwal, 2015). Commonly, market access mea-
sures only focus on the role of geographical distance on market participation
(Rahman, 2003; Dewi et al., 2005; Minten and Barrett, 2008). While a num-
ber of studies identify improvements in efficiency from farmers having direct
access to agricultural supply chains (Siamwalla, 1993; Besley and Burgess,
2000; Chamberlin and Jayne, 2013), very few explore the effect of the tempo-
ral variation in that access. I find that many mandis report no transactions
for many months of the year, implying these markets may not be a true option
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for periods outside harvest in India. This study complements the existing
literature on market access measures by accounting for the opening times of
local mandis that vary across both space (distance) and time (opening times)
as a determinant of household welfare.
3.2 Setting and Data
In India, the markets for food and grain crops are highly regulated. The
federal government sets floor prices (MSP), procures crops through the Food
Corporation of India, and provides food to poor households at a subsidized
price (Mallory and Baylis, 2013). Based on an extensive review of the ex-
pected production and consumption processes of a particular crop or com-
modity, the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices determines the
MSP levels at the beginning of each cropping season. The federal government
sets common national MSP levels, but each state in India may add ad-hoc ad-
ditional bonuses for a specific period. While the federal government procures
crops from these regulated agricultural markets (mostly paddy and wheat),
it sets MSP prices for most other crops (as well as a number of household
commodities including sugar and kerosene).
Prior to the liberalization of the Indian agricultural markets in the early
2000s, agricultural products were restricted from freely moving across states
and even districts. However, these restrictions have been relaxed since 2003,
and the Model Market Act now allows private buyers to trade cash crops
more freely across India (Jayasuriya et al., 2007). Despite the reforms, these
regulatory constraints, along with the need to sell to only a small number of
local, registered traders, result in there being few options for farmers outside
of their local traders, and thus low farmer bargaining power when negotiating
the price of their crops.
The data in this study come from two main sources. The first is the
Village Level Studies (VLS) program, which is part of the Village Dynam-
ics in South Asia (VDSA) project conducted by ICRISAT.6 The data are
part of the Second Generation VLS, which began collecting household data
in July 2001 from approximately 40 households per village in six villages
6See the VDSA project website for more information at
http://www.icrisat.org/vdsa/vdsa-microdoc.htm
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across four states. In 2009, the project was expanded to cover a total of 30
villages in eight states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Kar-
nataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra and Orissa).7 Figure 3.1 illustrates the
location of the villages in the sample. The household survey contains infor-
mation about household characteristics, demographic information, livelihood
strategies, household production and consumption decisions, cash crop trans-
actions, and monthly prices received from cash crop sales.8 The summary
statistics of the credit and price information are reported in levels, but in my
analysis I convert them to the logarithmic scale.
The second source of data contains price information collected by the
Indian Ministry of Agriculture. Each local government regulated market
(mandi) records daily maximum, minimum, modal prices, and the quantities
of each crop delivered every day at least one transaction took place. The
Ministry of Agriculture publishes detailed price information on its website,
AgMarkNet, and makes the data publicly available (AgMarkNet, 2015).
The unit of observation is the monthly sale of each crop by each household.
After removing missing data, the total sample size in the analysis is 4,845
observations. For each transaction, I have information about crop type,
quantities sold (in quintals), and prices received (in Rupees).
In Table 3.1, I report the descriptive statistics of economic and demo-
graphic characteristics of the sample households. Households in each village
are stratified based on their land ownership; landless, small, medium, and
large. According to the definition provided by ICRISAT in the data, land-
less farmers own 0.00-0.20 hectares, small farmers own 0.21-2.50 hectares,
medium farmers own 2.51-5.25 hectares, and large farmers own greater than
5.25 hectares. Of the 1,348 households in my sample, 312 are landless, 403
are in the small category, 332 are in the medium category, and are 301 in
the large category. Panel A presents the summary statistics of the demo-
graphic characteristics of the households in the sample. Panel B presents the
asset information divided into three categories: land assets, non-land assets,
and livestock assets. I measure non-land assets and livestock assets by using
principle component factor analysis to construct asset indices for these two
7The initial four states in which the survey was conducted are Andhra Pradesh, Maha-
rashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh. Currently, the data collection has also expanded
to a number of villages in Bangladesh, but they are not part of my analysis.
8The ICRISAT data also contain information about regional market prices, the prices
actually received by farmers and the timings of both harvest and sales
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asset categories. In Panel C, I report the access to storage facilities in the
sample. A very small portion of farmers in the sample have storage facilities,
ranging from only 0.03% among landless farmers up to 0.08% among large
farmers. I also report the market-equivalent value of their storage facilities
for those who own them. In Table 3.2, I report some of the characteristics
of the villages in my sample. Substantial variation exists among the villages
in terms of population size, access to the nearest town, and access to nearby
agricultural markets.
In Table 3.3, I present the summary statistics of crop sale information by
farmers. In the data, I observe production, consumption, and transaction
data from each household by month. To mitigate the potential issue of
farmers’ selecting into growing a particular cash crop, I restrict my analysis
to the marketing of the crops grown by most farmers in each of the villages in
the data.9 My analysis covers ten crops: black gram, chickpea, finger millet,
groundnut, maize, paddy, pigeonpea, sorghum, soybean, and wheat. Even
for the same crop, I observe considerable variation in prices both across space
and time. I also observe substantial variation in prices received by farmers
across different levels of land ownership. For example, Figure 3.2 presents
the variation in prices of paddy over time by months after harvest. In Figure
3.3, I present the variation in the median paddy prices received by farmers
within each village over time, which exhibit variation in crop prices across
villages in the sample. Overall, prices of maize, paddy, and wheat are less
dispersed than other pulse and oilseed crops.
Panel A presents the average prices of crops sold by each transaction sepa-
rated by farmer category. Column (1) reports the average prices that farmers
received for each crop, pooling across all villages and all years within my sam-
ple. I observe substantial variation in prices received by farmers selling the
same crop in the same village, even within the same time period. Columns
(2) and (3) report the average of monthly prices offered by the village trader,
and by the trader from the nearest market. In Panel B I present the average
number of transactions for each crop by season with which I observe sub-
stantial difference in the average amount sold per transaction across crops.
In Table 3.4, I report information about the amount of agricultural credit
obtained by farmers in my sample contingent on land ownership. Loans
9I restrict my analysis to the crops grown in each village by more than half of the
non-landless farmers in my sample.
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from financial institutions are usually larger than loans from non-institutions,
and come with lower interest rates on average. In India, farmers who use
agricultural credit from financial institutions are required to register their
assets, usually their land, as collateral in case of default. Land assets need
to be re-registered every six months, to ensure the land title is up to date.10
Further, even those with land may find it difficult to access credit from
the financial institutions without connections. As a result, landless farmers
often have to borrow from non-institutional financial providers and face high
interest rates. I compare the amount of loans received by farmers and their
interest rates up to six months before a state election versus not, which
should create an appropriate counterfactual for my setting. I find that the
amount of credit provided by public banks increases right before an election,
as presented in Figure 3.4 for the state of Karnataka. I see lower interest rates
offered right before an election, with the most significant decrease among
loans offered by non-institutional financial sources, as illustrated in Figure
3.5 for the state of Maharashtra. While interest rates for agricultural loans
from public banks are determined by each state’s banking committee, other
types of lenders may response to the increased credit provision by public
banks by lowering their interest rates associated with the loans they offer.
In Table 3.5, I report the measure of market access. The measure is the
number of weeks markets in the 50 km surrounding a village are open each
month. I downloaded the maximum, minimum, and modal price data from
AgMarkNet (from prices reported on every Monday of each week). Field
tests indicated that 50 kilometers is the maximum distance that farmers
can physically and reasonably travel to the agricultural markets themselves.
The results show that the number of weeks the markets are open decreases
after harvest. The quantity of crops supplied to the market decreases after
harvest, and increases just before the start of the next growing season. I
do not observe a clear trend in farm gate prices after harvest, implying that
there may not always be the potential to gain a higher price by waiting to
sell after harvest.
Finally, in Table 3.6, I provide a number of summary statistics that may
help explain the possible mechanisms of the effect of credit on farm gate
prices. First, I observe a high proportion of farmers in the sample receive
10Anecdotally, in some contexts, re-registering land titles may require paying a bribe.
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credit from public banks during the six months before an election, particu-
larly among small farmers. I see a greater number of transactions per season
for paddy and wheat, but not for other crops. The quantities of crop sold
before elections are smaller on average for all crops. Last, I see farmers who
sell their crops in the six months leading to an election receive higher prices,
especially for crops other than paddy and wheat.
3.3 Identification Strategy
This study asks whether access to agricultural credit and nearby markets
may allow farmers to receive higher crop prices. Specifically, I test whether
these factors may help explain the heterogeneity the prices of cash crops
farmers report to have received at the time of sale. I estimate a reduced-
form equation as follows:
pijkt = α + βyit + γAkt + ωXit + , (3.1)
where pijkt is the log price of crop j farmer i living in village k receives at
time t, yit is the log level of agricultural credit received by farmer i in time
t, Akt is the market access measure faced by farmers in village k receives at
time t and Xit is the set of household characteristics.
A number of factors could drive farmer access to credit, some of which
likely also affect the price received for a crop. To overcome the endogeneity of
the access to credit, I exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in state-level
election schedules across India to explain a boost in agricultural lending in
India during an election year.11 The rationale for this identification strategy
is based on the observation by Cole (2009) that state governments increased
agricultural credit leading in the months leading up to a state election. Sev-
eral papers document an increase in the amount of agricultural lending in
an election year relative to lending in off-election years using district-level
credit provision data and document a positive and significant relationship
11While the Constitution of India requires that state-level elections must take place
every five years, the actual timing of the elections may not perfectly correspond to this
timeline. State-level elections may take place before they are scheduled due to any change
in the government leadership (Cole, 2009). In the sample, all state elections map perfectly
to their scheduled timeline. Therefore, I argue that there is no spurious occurrence of any
state elections before the scheduled time in my sample.
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between state elections and credit supply (Cole, 2009; De and Vij, 2012;
Kumar, 2014). Specifically, I use the following relationship to represent the
exogenous change in access to credit of farmers in my sample.
yit = α + βElectionrt + γr + ωt + δi + , (3.2)
where yit is the log level of agricultural credit received by farmer i in time
t , Electionrt represents an indicator variable equal to 1 if state r holds a
state election in the following six months, γr is the village fixed effects, ωt
is the year fixed effects, and δi is a dummy variable for farmer category as
classified by ICRISAT.
Within the context of India, this identification strategy is reasonable due
to the nature of the relationship between state governments and the legal
and financial institutions of each state (Cole, 2009). Each state govern-
ment appoints members of its legislative assembly to serve in the “State
Level Bankers Committee.” This committee regulates financial policies and
practices in each state, and is dissolved at the end of each legislative term.
Although the committee does not have formal authority over the operations
of banks and other financial institutions within the state, it holds quarterly
meetings to determine levels of financial credit to be offered by public banks
and other financial institutions within a state. These committees may in-
fluence public banks to offer greater amount of credit for political purposes.
The Constitution of India mandates each state to hold elections to elect mem-
bers of the Vidhan Sabha, or the Legislative Assembly of each state every
five years. This election schedule mandated by the Constitution varies from
state to state.
There are two advantages to the unsynchronized nature of this election
schedule (Cole, 2009). First, national economic conditions will affect all
states simultaneously, and will therefore not be correlated with state elec-
tions. Further, I rule out potential reverse causality in that interest rates are
not likely to affect timing of state elections.
Since increasing agricultural credit supply can be costly to the state govern-
ments, each state might only choose to intervene the credit market only in the
months leading up to an election in areas that would require greater political
support. A sizable amount of literature including Snyder (1989), Dixit and
Londregan (1996), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Cole (2009) observe
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larger increases in government grants in areas where political competition is
particularly strong to capture the swing votes. However, I do not observe
enough variation in the political competition data within the districts in my
sample.
To qualify as a valid instrument for agricultural credit offered by public
banks, state-level elections should not affect prices in any other way except
through loans. I verify this claim by considering alternative mechanisms
through which elections may directly affect crop prices. In all scenarios, I
find that the results are driven by the effect of elections on the provision of
agricultural credit, and not through these other mechanisms.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Main Results
I begin my analysis by examining the direct effect of state-level elections
on farm gate prices, and present the results in Table 3.7. Panel A reports
the direct of effect of elections on prices. My results indicate that crop
prices received by farmers are positively and significantly higher in the six
months leading up to a state election, controlling for household, village-
level, and crop-specific characteristics. I include a linear time trend for the
number of months after harvest. The results are positive and significant
when I both control for crop year fixed effects and not.12 Specifically, in the
six months prior to a state election, crop prices are 0.165 and 0.094 times
higher than they are outside this time window, without and with crop year
fixed effects (Columns (1) and (2)). I also use calendar year fixed effects in
place of cropping rotation fixed effects and the results remain qualitatively
unchanged.
In Panel B, I add an additional control to both specifications. The number
of weeks nearby markets are open is a sum of the number of weeks nearby
markets are open for sales of any crop. Nearby is defined as being within a
12I define a crop year in India to cover an annual crop year, which include two to three
seasons. This cropping rotation varies by state and depends heavily on agro-climatic
factors of each state. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the kharif or summer season
starts in June and ends in November while the rabi or winter season starts in December
and ends in May.
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50 km radius of the village. If more than one market is open in the vicinity,
I add up the total number of weeks each market is open in a month. This
variable accounts for the level of market accessibility farmers have to sell their
crops after harvest, which should capture the level of a farmer’s dependence
on village agricultural traders. The market accessibility variable is positive
and significant, suggesting that farmers in areas with a market open one
more week in the month tend to receive higher prices for their crops by
approximately 1.7% and 0.92% on average, holding all else constant (Table
3.7, Columns (1) and (2)). However, this variable is no longer significant
when I control for crop season fixed effects.13 After controlling for market
access, I still find strong and positive effects of state elections on crop prices.
Next, in Table 3.8, I explore the channel through which state elections
affect crop prices. In this study, the identification relies on the plausibly
exogenous variation in the state-level election schedule as a potential shock
to agricultural credit offered by public banks. For Panel A, the results in
Column (1) shows that farmers who receive a 1% larger agricultural loan
from public banks up to six months before elections report 1.12% higher
prices for their crops compared to those who receive credit outside this time
window. The point estimate of the effect of credit is no longer significant
when I include the crop year fixed effects but the magnitude is still similar,
as shown in Column (2). A possible explanation for the change in statistical
significance is that the crop year fixed effects remove a lot of the variation in
the instrument, the state election timeline.14 In Panel B, I control for market
access, and the results remain qualitatively unchanged. I still find similarly
significant effects of credit on crop prices (a 1.31% increase in prices from
a 1% increase in credit). Specifically, if farmers live in areas with a market
open one more week in the month, prices farmers receive tend to increase by
approximately 1.6%. I control for the seasonality of credit by including the
dummy variable for the number of months after harvest in all the regression
specifications.15
13I have also added another control variable; the share of average deliveries to the
nearby mandis per cropping season to several of the specifications. This is to capture any
idiosyncratic shock to the production which is specific to each crop by season, but the
coefficient estimate of this variable is usually insignificant.
14One argument that may help reconcile the need to include the crop year fixed effects
is that I test for the trend of crop prices after harvest by season. I do not find any distinct
upward or downward trend of crop prices after harvest for all of the seasons in my sample.
15In another unreported specification, I control for household fixed effects and I find out
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In another set of specifications reported in Table 3.9, I test whether farmers
who benefit from greater access to credit up to six months before elections
receive prices for their crops significantly different from the median prices of
the transactions for that crop occurred right at harvest within the same vil-
lage. I also test if there is a significant difference between prices received by
farmers and the MSP levels. Either when do not include the market access
control (Panel A), and when I do (Panel B), I do not observe a significant
difference between prices received by farmers and the median prices received
within the same village right at harvest, and between the prices received and
the MSP levels. In another set of unreported specifications, I find no sig-
nificant effect of credit on prices received by farmers and the median prices
received within the same village right at harvest when I split the sample be-
tween paddy and wheat, and all other crops. However, I observe a significant
effect of credit on prices received by farmers and the MSP levels for all other
crops, but no significant effect for paddy and wheat.
I am interested in finding out if the positive and significant effects of credit
on crop prices received by farmers may be specific to certain crops. In Table
3.10, I split the sample to two categories: paddy and wheat (Column (1)), and
all other crops (Column (2)). In Panel A, I do not control for market access
and I do so in Panel B. My results indicate that there is no significant effect of
credit on prices of paddy or wheat received by farmers in the six months prior
to state elections. This finding is not surprising due to the heavy intervention
of the government in the paddy and wheat markets in India. Prices of paddy
and wheat are subject to heavy regulation throughout the year, and thus
increased access to credit due to elections may not help farmers store their
crop to receive better prices. However, I find strong and positive significant
effects of credit on prices of other crops in the sample. Specifically, I find
that a one percentage increase in credit supply from public banks ahead of
state elections is associated with approximately a 0.82% increase in prices of
crops other than paddy without market controls (Column (2), Panel A), and
a 0.98% increase in prices when including market control variables (Column
(2), Panel B).
I expect that the effect of the increase in credit provision by public banks
ahead of state elections may vary depending on farm size. One might hy-
that my coefficient estimates remain qualitatively similar.
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pothesize that if large farmers already have ready access to credit, increased
credit provision may not facilitate waiting or bargaining for higher prices.16
In Table 3.11, I test whether the effects of credit based on farmer category
by interacting the credit variable with the dummy variable for each farmer
category. I find that relative to other farmer categories in the dataset, small
farmers benefit from increased access to credit due to state elections more
than medium and large farmers (Table 3.11, Column (1)). Specifically, a 1%
increase in the amount of public loans to small farmers from public banks
up to six months before elections lead to approximately 0.285% higher crop
prices they receive relative to those of farmers in other categories. An inter-
esting implication both in terms of welfare outcomes and rural credit policy
may be drawn from this finding. Smaller farmers often have very limited
access to credit from public sources, but the credit shock ahead of elections
opens up opportunities for them to use credit, which as a result allow them
to earn higher prices for their crops. Medium and larger farmers, on the
other hand, may be more able to access agricultural credit from public banks
regardless whether it is ahead of an election or not, so the credit shock due
to state elections may not benefit their received crop prices as much as it
does crop prices of smaller farmers. It may, however, have subsidized their
borrowing costs directly by way of lower interest rates.
In Table 3.12, I explore the extent to which greater accessibility to nearby,
open agricultural markets within a 50 kilometer radius of each village may
allow farmers to use credit to improve crop prices they receive. To test
this hypothesis, I add an interaction term between credit and the number
of weeks agricultural markets around each village is opened. In Column (1)
using the full sample, I find that farmers who are in areas with 1% additional
access to agricultural markets nearby receive approximately 3.6% for their
crops at the time of sale. My results suggest evidence that if access to
nearby, open agricultural markets help farmers improve the crop prices they
receive for a number of reasons. First, access to markets facilitates greater
price information, which may allow farmers to strategically plan their timing
of sales to obtain higher prices. Second, by reducing transactions costs,
16I check if there is a direct effect of elections on the level of interest rates among larger
farmers. My results (unreported, but available by request) show that larger farmers also
benefit from borrowing ahead of state elections because they could borrow with lower
interest rates. However, the reduction in interest rates does not appear to translate to
higher prices for them.
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it reduces farmers’ dependence on traders, and therefore improving farmers’
bargaining positions (Upton and Fuller, 2004). This finding provides evidence
that increased market access may help farmers help farmers better benefit
from the increase in agricultural loans increase in agricultural loans in the
months leading up to a state election. Additionally, I split the sample to
explore the effects of this interaction separately by crop (paddy and wheat
versus others) in Columns (2) and (3). However, I do not find a significant
effect of this interaction term in either specification.
Earlier, I showed that increased credit provision ahead of state elections
increases farm gate prices. In Table 3.13, I investigate how interest rates may
affect prices received by farmers. It may be possible that as public banks
increase their credit supply to farmers ahead of state elections, other credit
sources may try to compete with public banks by offering loans with lower
interest rates.17 Thus, lower interest rates may affect farmers who not only
take out loans from public banks, but by improving their outside options and
increasing their bargaining power. For this regression specification, I take the
average of the interest rates across all types of loans taken up farmers in the
same village in a particular cultivation season. In Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 3.12, I find that a 1% reduction in interest rates ahead of elections lead
to 0.048% and 0.05% increases in crop prices received by farmers at the time
of sale. These results show that higher crop prices received by farmers ahead
of elections not only operate through increased credit provision by public
banks, but also lower interest rates offered.
3.4.2 Possible Mechanisms
While finding a positive effect of credit on farm gate prices is evocative, to
glean implications for policy, we need to understand the possible channel
through which this effect occurs. Although there could be several mecha-
nisms that may help explain my findings, I cannot directly test for them.
Instead, I explore some of the summary statistics that may offer possible
explanations about the actual mechanisms through which agricultural credit
may help farmers receive higher farm gate prices. From the summary statis-
tics reported in Table 3.6, on average I observe a higher proportion of farmers
17I think this is a reasonable justification to use average interest rates because most
loans taken up by farmers in the sample are from non-institutional financial sources.
54
receiving credit from public sources within the six months leading up to an
election, especially for small farmers in my data. This evidence of greater
credit availability to small farmers corresponds with my results in Table 3.11,
which I find that small farmers benefit the most from increased credit provi-
sion.
Another useful statistic to consider is the number of transactions taking
place in a cropping season. Overall, I observe a larger number of transactions
per season within the six months prior to an election for paddy and wheat,
but smaller number of transactions for other crops. Anecdotally, I learned
that farmers usually set aside a portion of their harvested paddy and wheat
for own consumption, and might sell a portion of this reserve later in the
season if they need cash in the case of an exogenous shock such as illnesses
or festivities. Due to the increased credit supply, farmers do not need to store
as much paddy and wheat for emergency sale later in the season. On the other
hand, for crops other than paddy and wheat, increased credit supply ahead
of elections relaxes the need for farmers to sell immediately after harvest,
and receive higher prices from traders later in the growing season. The
information about the quantities of crops sold corresponds with this story.
Overall, I observe smaller quantities of crops sold on average within a season
before an election, confirming that increased credit relaxes the need to set
aside crops to sale later in the season in case of exogenous cash needs.
One another possible mechanism through which increased agricultural credit
can help farmers receive higher farm gate prices is through improved bargain-
ing power with traders. While I cannot test for this hypothesis explicitly, the
summary statistics about the prices received by farmers for their crops dur-
ing the six months before an election versus not may offer some evidence of
improved bargaining power. Specifically, prices farmers received for paddy
and wheat are similar, but prices received for other crops are higher before
an election. This observation is not surprising due to the strict federal regu-
lation for direct procurement of paddy and wheat. However, the fact that I
see increased credit from public banks before elections, and that I see higher
prices for crops other than paddy and wheat before elections, could suggest
some evidence that farmers could improve their bargaining power against
traders when they have higher credit.
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3.4.3 Robustness Checks
Other Types of Loans
If my hypothesis is accurate that the effect of elections largely occurs through
the increase in provision of agricultural loans by public banks, I would expect
to observe the largest effect of elections through credit from public sources,
and not though other sources of credit. To verify this hypothesis, I test if
state elections affect a change in the amount of agricultural loans taken up by
farmers in the sample from sources other than public banks: private banks,
non-institutional sources, and agriculture-related non-institutional sources.
The results in Table 3.14 illustrate that there is no significant effect of
state elections on agricultural loans from sources other than public banks.
Thus, I verify that the relationship between increased credit uptake among
farmers ahead of state elections and higher prices received for their crops are
not driven by loans from other sources than mainly from public banks.
Minimum Support Prices (MSP)
Second, one might be concerned that state elections might be associated
with other government programs or policies related to agriculture. The first
concern is that, during election years, the local government might implement
policies that would affect local prices of agricultural commodities in each
state. Such policy is likely to influence the reference market prices, and the
prices received by farmers.
I check if there is any significant increase in the MSP levels or the minimum
prices of crops delivered to the nearby mandis around each village in the
months leading up to state elections. I do not find any significant increase in
the MSP levels or the minimum prices of crops at the mandis. Additionally,
since MSP are common for all markets in India, it is unlikely that state-level
electoral cycles may associate with any price differentials received by farmers
in the months leading up to state elections. I report the list of MSP prices
for all crops in Table 3.15.
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Government-sponsored Agricultural Assistance Programs
One might be worried that state elections may generate increases in fund-
ing for other government-sponsored agricultural assistance programs. Crop
insurance and input subsidy programs offered by public sources may help
reduce farmers’ cultivation costs, and thus reduce the amount they need to
borrow at the beginning of the cropping season. Farmers in India spend the
majority of their agricultural credit to purchase inputs or to borrow against
crop losses, such as those caused by weather, and thus input prices and crop
insurance may substantially affect demand for credit. To test for this con-
cern, I drop farmers who receive at least some form of crop insurance or input
subsidy from the sample, and run the main specification again.18
My results indicate that receiving credit from public banks ahead of state
elections still result in farmers receiving higher crop prices, even among those
farmers who do not receive crop insurance or input subsidy programs (Table
3.16, Columns (1) and (2)). Therefore, I may rule out the possibility that the
results are largely driven by government-sponsored crop insurance or input
subsidy programs.
Household Heterogeneity
It is likely that very poor farmers without sufficient landholding or assets to
use as collateral for credit may not be able to obtain credit when they need
to. On the other hand, relatively wealthy farmers may not require increased
access to credit in order to receive better prices for their crops due to their
greater outside options. To deal with this concern, I drop landless farmers
(who may have very limited other forms of assets to use as collaterals) and
farmers whose landholding belong to the top decile within each village, and
run the main specification in Table 3.7.
In Table 3.17, I present results when I drop landless farmers (Column (1)),
I drop the largest 10% of land owners (Column (2)), and both groups of
farmers (Column (3)) from my analysis. After controlling for a number of
factors, I still find positive and significant effects of credit from public banks
on prices received by farmers for their crops. I find that the largest effects
18Since I only do not have information about crop insurance and input subsidy for
households in three states: Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa. I also drop households in these
three states from this robustness check.
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of credit on prices when I drop the landless farmers from the specification,
and that magnitude of the effect of credit become smaller when I exclude the
largest 10% of land owners in each village from the specifications. These two
findings suggest that the landless farmers and the largest land owners in the
sample drive the effects of credit on prices farmers receive at farm gate to a
certain extent.
To provide a qualification that elections should not affect credit for landless
farmers, who do not usually have access to formal credit due to the lack of
collaterals, I test for the effect of credit on prices only among landless farmers
in the sample. In another unreported specification, I test for the effects of
agricultural loans from public banks on farm gate prices just among landless
farmers, but I do not find significant effect of credit (Column (4)). I also
run another specification to test for the direct effects of elections on prices
among the landless farmers, and I observe no significant effect of elections
on prices received by farmers (Column (5)). These two results indicate that
the landless farmers do not drive my results.
3.5 Conclusions
In this study, I provide empirical evidence that increased agricultural credit
provision by public banks, and greater access to nearby, open agricultural
markets may help farmers improve farm gate prices for their crops. To ac-
count for the potential endogeneity of credit provision, I exploit the plausibly
exogenous variation in state-level elections which take place at different times
across states in India. I find that the credit shock from public banks and
lower interest rates for agricultural loans ahead of state-level elections in-
crease farm gate prices at the time of sale. I find that the effects of credit
are only specific to crops other than paddy and wheat, whose trade is under
heavy government control throughout the year. I note that the effects of
increased credit are most significant among small farmers, who often have
few options of obtaining credit from financial institutions. I also show that
factors including government assistance programs related to agriculture and
agricultural credit from sources other than public banks do not drive my
findings.
My results are important for policies related to financial systems and mar-
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ket infrastructures in rural areas of developing countries. I argue that while
expanding credit provision to small-scale farmers may be beneficial for farm-
ers in terms of both agricultural production and marketing purposes, it is
not sufficient for farmers to improve their farm revenue, and thus household
welfare. The absence of sufficient access to nearby, open agricultural markets
may open up opportunities for agricultural traders to take advantage of the
limited bargaining powers farmers have to extract profits away from them.
The expansion of functioning agricultural market infrastructures in the rural
areas of India may be necessary to help farmers improve their bargaining
power against agricultural traders, guarantee more stable crop prices, and
subsequently improve their farm revenues.
I note at least three limitations in the study. First, the data run from July
2009 to June 2014, covering only twelve state-level elections. I recognize that
the relatively short time span of the data may not be sufficient to fully cap-
ture the relationship between state-level election cycles and credit provision
in India. However, this limitation may be accounted for to a certain ex-
tent since the election schedule of each state does not occur simultaneously.
Second, state elections may also affect other aspects of agricultural market-
ing. Therefore, the concern is that receiving agricultural assistance programs
from the government may reduce the need to acquire loans for agricultural
production, which may help farmers improve their bargaining power against
traders through other channels than agricultural credit from public banks.
In the data, I observe whether households receive subsidized input and crop
insurance programs from the government. I test whether state elections af-
fect public agricultural assistance programs which may help farmers improve
their crop prices. However, other types of agricultural assistance programs
may associate with higher crop prices, but are not documented in my dataset.
Third, a considerable amount of the variation in prices farmers received for
their crops may be attributed to differential quality. I reconcile this concern
by arguing that the AgMarkNet offers different levels of prices for each crop
based on observed quality. It provides a guideline for traders operating in
the regulated markets to follow in order to assign prices to crops delivered
to the markets. Therefore, in this study, I assume that differential quality of
crops should already be manifested in differential prices received by farmers.
However, there could still be other quality-related issues that may associate
with differential prices farmers received, which is a limitation in this study.
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Table 3.1: Household and Demographic Characteristics by Farmer Category
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Landless Small Medium Large
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A. Demographic information
Age of head 45.95 12.58 49.64 12.15 49.80 12.27 53.59 13.34
Gender of head (=1 if male) 0.88 0.32 0.91 0.29 0.95 0.21 0.97 1.17
Number of male adults 1.95 1.09 2.39 1.33 2.39 1.33 2.72 1.77
Number of female adults 1.92 1.01 2.10 1.64 2.10 1.16 2.43 1.45
Number of children 1.09 1.14 1.14 1.22 1.14 1.22 1.01 1.25
Household size 4.98 2.23 5.64 2.65 5.64 2.65 6.18 3.28
B. Asset information
Landholding (acre) 0.55 1.69 2.12 1.71 3.88 3.50 8.54 9.17
Non-land asset (index) -0.30 0.82 0.02 0.81 0.10 0.92 0.45 0.95
Livestock asset (index) -0.42 0.71 -0.12 0.81 0.16 1.04 0.51 1.20
C. Storage facilities
Storage (=1 if yes) 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27
Facility value (1,000 Rs.) 0.67 1.07 9.58 18.02 28.08 90.72 69.24 166.61
Observations 312 403 332 301
Note 1: I follow the farmer classification system employed by ICRISAT and define as
follows: landless farms: 0.00-0.20 hectares; small farms: 0.21-2.50 hectares; medium farms:
2.51-5.25 hectares; large farms: > 5.25 hectares.
Note 2: I calculate asset indices for non-land assets and livestock assets using the principle
component analysis method.
Note 3: Landholding includes both owned and leased-out land areas.
Note 4: Non-land asset includes the following asset categories: house ownership, courtyard,
bathroom, cable TV, cooking gas, electricity, tap water, toilet, strong walls.
Note 5: Livestock asset includes the following asset categories: cattle, goat, horse, milk
(cow and she buffalo), pig, poultry (including duck and pigeon), sheep, young stock.
Note 6: The survey specifically asked farmers about proper storage structures available
on-farm and their values if they were to sell them.
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Table 3.2: Village Characteristics
All Villages
Variable Mean S.D.
Village characteristics
Population (headcount) 2,367.20 1,620.89
Distance to nearest town (km.) 12.18 7.62
Number of mandis (within 50 km. boundary) 1.73 1.31
Observations 30
Note 1: Village population information comes from the Census of India 2011,
http://www.censusindia.gov.in (Accessed May 3, 2015)
Note 2: Distance to the nearest town information comes from ICRISAT’s
VDSA dataset.
Note 3: The information about the mandi locations comes from AgMarkNet,
http://agmarknet.nic.in/ (Accessed May 3, 2015).
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Table 3.11: Effect of Agricultural Credit from Public Banks on Price
(1) (2) (3)
Small Farmer Medium Farmer Large Farmer
Variable Price Price Price
Effect of credit on prices
Public loan size 0.148*** 0.202*** 0.209***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.027)
Public loan size × Farm category 0.137*** -0.053** -0.065***
(0.039) (0.023) (0.022)
HH Controls Yes Yes Yes
Market Control Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Crop FE Yes Yes Yes
Farmer category FE Yes Yes Yes
Months after harvest Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,845 4,845 4,845
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note 1: This table reports the effects of agricultural credit from public banks on crop
prices received by farmer category. I instrument for the amount of credit from public
banks provided with the ‘treatment’ state-elections. All specifications are estimated with
household control variables: land ownership, livestock index and asset index. Credit, price,
and market control variables are in the logarithmic scale.
Note 2: I follow the farmer classification system employed by ICRISAT and define as
follows: landless farms: 0.00-0.20 hectares; small farms: 0.21-2.50 hectares; medium farms:
2.51-5.25 hectares; large farms: > 5.25 hectares.
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Table 3.12: Effect of Agricultural Credit from Public Banks on Price
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Paddy & Wheat Other Crops
Variable Price Price Price
Effect of credit on prices
Public loan size 0.167*** 0.119 0.118***
(0.023) (0.486) (0.027)
No. of weeks nearby markets opened 0.021* -0.027 0.071***
(0.011) (0.027) (0.016)
Public loan size × No. of weeks opened 0.015* -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.036) (0.009)
HH Controls Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Crop FE Yes Yes Yes
Farmer category FE Yes Yes Yes
Months after harvest Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,845 2,091 2,755
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note 1: This table reports the effects of agricultural credit from public banks on crop
prices received interacted with market access. I instrument for the amount of credit
from public banks provided with the ‘treatment’ state-elections. All specifications are
estimated with household control variables: land ownership, livestock index and asset
index. Credit, price, and market control variables are in the logarithmic scale.
Note 2: The number of weeks markets opened captures the total number of weeks
agricultural markets within a 50 kilometer of a village report price and quantities,
pooling all markets together.
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Table 3.13: Effect of Interest Rate on Price
(1) (2)
Full Sample Full Sample
Variable Price Price
Effect of interest rate on prices
Interest rates (%) -0.048*** -0.050***
(0.017) (0.019)
Interest rates (%) × Months after harvest - 0.003
- (0.003)
HH Controls Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Crop FE Yes Yes
Farmer category FE Yes Yes
Months after harvest Yes Yes
Observations 4,845 4,845
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note 1: This table reports the effects of interest rates on crop prices received.
I instrument for the interest rate shock with the ‘treatment’ state-elections.All
specifications are estimated with household control variables: land ownership,
livestock index and asset index. Credit, price, and market control variables are
in the logarithmic scale.
Note 2: I take the average interest rate associated with all loans taken up by
farmers within a village. I also limit my sample to only loans taken up by
farmers from non-institutional financial sources and I still find similar results.
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Table 3.15: Minimum Support Prices (MSP)
Commodity Variety 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Crop
Black Gram 2,520 2,900 3,300 4,300 4,300
Chickpea 1,730 1,760 2,100 2,800 3,000
Finger Millet 915 965 1,050 1,500 1,500
Groundnut 2,100 2,100 2,300 2,700 3,700
Maize 840 880 890 1,175 1,250
Paddy Common 950 1,000 1,080 1,250 1,310
Grade A 980 1,030 1,110 1,280 1,345
Pigeonpea 2,300 3,000 3,200 3,850 4,300
Sorghum Hybrid 840 880 890 1,500 1,530
Maldandi 860 900 1,000 1,520 1,530
Soybean Black 1,350 1,400 1,650 2,200 2,500
Yellow 1,390 1,440 1,690 2,240 2,560
Wheat 1,100 1,120 1,285 1,350 1,400
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India,
http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/MSP.htm (Accessed March 30, 2015)
Note 1: Prices reported are in Rupees per quintal.
Note 2: All prices reported are according to crop year.
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Table 3.16: Robustness Checks: Agricultural Assistance Programs
(1) (2)
Drop Drop
Insurance Subsidy
Variable Price Price
Direct effect of elections on prices
Election 0.594 0.476
(0.432) (0.490)
HH Controls Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Crop FE Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes
Farmer category FE Yes Yes
Months after harvest Yes Yes
Observations 3,901 3,901
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note 1: This table reports the direct effect of elections
on crop prices received for farmers who do not receive
government-funded crop insurance or input subsidy. Credit
and price variables are in the logarithmic scale.
Note 2: The dataset reports whether a farmer receives crop
insurance or input subsidy from the government and its
amount (in Rupees). I restrict my sample in both speci-
fications among those who do not receive either (1) crop
insurance or (2) input subsidy from the government.
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Figure 3.1: Location of the villages in my sample
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Figure 3.2: Paddy price variation over time
Figure 3.3: Paddy price variation over space
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Figure 3.4: Average public loan size by month, Karnataka
Figure 3.5: Average interest rates for all loans by month, Maharashtra
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CHAPTER 4
FRIENDS OR TRADERS? DO SOCIAL
NETWORKS EXPLAIN THE USE OF
MARKET MECHANISMS BY FARMERS IN
INDIA
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
Why do some farmers sell their crops to the same trader over a long period
of time while others do not? There are at least two possible reasons for
these long-term, informal contracts. In the contract farming literature, small-
scale farmers who sell to the same buyer are guaranteed a steady level of
income through more stable prices and constant demand (Key and Runsten,
1999; Miyata et al., 2009). Conversely, the rural indebtedness literature
suggests that farmers are forced, either financially or socially, to sell their
cash crops to the same trader (Mitra et al., 1986). Being forced to sell to
only one channel prevents farmers from taking advantage of outside options
including occasional price spikes due to seasonal variation, extreme weather,
or exogenous supply shocks. This study tests whether farmers’ social network
characteristics and the decisions of their peers are correlated with a farmer’s
decision to have a long-term relationship with a trader. The study location
is Thaltukhod Valley, located in Himachal Pradesh, India. In my setting, a
long-term relationship between a farmer and a trader is commonly a verbally
agreed informal contract that a farmer will sell cash crops to a specific trader
for multiple periods. The relationships I observe in my setting last for at
least 10 years.
Market intermediaries such as traders can help reduce transaction costs
by disseminating market information and guaranteeing constant demand for
crops throughout the growing season (Spulber, 1999; Banerji and Meenakshi,
2004). Personal relationships can also help reduce transaction costs by fos-
tering information exchange, sharing risk, and taking advantage of economies
of scale (Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). Although a number of studies have
analyzed the importance of both social interactions and traders in economic
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outcomes in developing countries (Fafchamps, 1998; Fafchamps and Minten,
1999; Fafchamps and Minten., 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Lyon, 2000;
Conley and Udry, 2010), very little quantitative research explores the rela-
tionship between social networks and traders among farmers.
In Thaltukhod Valley, I observe that some farmers sell their cash crops to a
specific trader continuously while others do not. Of those farmers who do not
have a relationship with a trader, I see substantial differences in cash crop
revenues between those whose peers use a trader versus those whose peers
do not, particularly within a certain range of cash crop revenue (between
approximately 5,000 to 15,000 Rupees during the past 12 months preceding
my survey). Farmers with access to a trader through their peers earn more
than those who neither use a trader themselves nor have access to one through
their friends.1
This study attempts to link social network characteristics of farmers to
their decision to have a long-term relationship with a trader. In particular,
I investigate whether the variation in number of connections, diversity, and
position in the social network are associated with the decision to have a
long-term relationship with a trader, and look at whether social networks act
as compliments or as substitutes for the more formal market mechanism of
having a long-term relationship with a trader. I use social network analysis to
derive characteristics of social networks, which encompass several attributes
including the size, density, structure, and location within the network. Thus,
I explore whether the nature of the social network and the position within
the network are correlated with the decision to have a long-term relationship
with a trader.
Further, I test whether farmers’ decisions to have a long-term relationship
with a trader are dependent on the decisions of their peers. Using spatial
econometric methods, I test whether a household’s peers significantly affect
a household’s decision to have a long-term relationship with a trader. One
might be concerned that the peer effects are largely picking up unobserved
effects of geography. To account for this concern, I show that my estimates
are not largely driven by the effects of geographical proximity.
I find that farmers with a greater number of connections are less likely
to establish a long-term trader-specific relationship. I also observe a strong
1See Figure 4.1 for illustration of this statistical evidence.
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effect of peers’ outcomes on one’s decision to have a long-term relationship:
if a farmer’s peers adopt a long-term relationship, the farmer is also much
more likely to do so. Household characteristics including livestock ownership
(which may suggest evidence of greater time constraints and endowment)
and caste (which may suggest evidence of sorting among social groups) are
important determinants of a household’s decision to have a long-term re-
lationship with a trader. I instrument for peers’ outcomes using observed
attributes of peers of peers to account for peers’ outcomes being jointly de-
termined and endogenous. Then, I conduct a number of robustness checks
to verify the validity of my results. However, I am aware that I might not be
able to completely account for biases resulting from possible endogeneity of
farmers’ social relationships and other unobserved characteristics that may
influence my results.
I see three main contributions of this study. First, to my knowledge, this is
one of the first studies to analyze how a household’s position within a social
network relates to the decision to have a long-term crop-specific relationship
with a trader. My measures are not restricted to whether a tie exists between
two households, but also include the nature, closeness, density, and degree
of contact among the households in each village. In particular, I extend the
literature by confirming peers may influence an individual’s marketing deci-
sions in agriculture (Fafchamps, 1998; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999). I focus
on how social network characteristics affect economic outcomes similar to the
work by Banerjee et al. (2013). Second, I take advantage of a dataset that in-
cludes information from all households across the 17 villages in Thaltukhod
Valley containing detailed information about personal relationships at the
individual level. The third contribution of this study is that this is one of
the first studies to apply novel spatial econometric methods to the study of
social networks in the context of agricultural context of a developing country.
The empirical findings in this study might motivate subsequent theoretical
developments of a relationship between social relationships and agricultural
contracts.
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4.2 Literature Review
In India, agricultural traders are important actors for farmers in their pro-
duction and marketing strategies. Traders usually reside within the villages,
and have sufficient financial resources to become sources of informal lending,
especially for farmers who do not have access to credit from financial institu-
tions like banks. Therefore, farmers may have long-term relationships with
traders to borrow for their cultivation activities, input purchases, harvest
costs, and any other random events such as crop losses, illnesses, weddings,
and funerals.
On the other hand, the dependence on traders may not always be beneficial
for farmers. Farmers who borrow from traders often incur high interest rates,
which may come in the form of a penalty on their crop prices. Moreover,
farmers are expected to back their loans to the traders right at harvest,
necessitating immediate sale of their crops. And before they can borrow
again for the next cropping season, they are required to pay back their loans
first, which also means selling crops immediately crop sales after harvest. Due
to the frequent absence of outside options for farmers to borrow, farmers have
little bargaining power with their traders. This type relationship not only
prevents farmers from taking advantage of arbitrage after harvest, they may
also receive lower returns to their crops.
4.2.1 Contract Farming
Contract farming is one medium that can facilitate the sale of cash crops for
small-scale farmers in many developing countries (Morrissy, 1974). Farm-
ers who participate in this type of contract usually receive seed, fertilizer,
technical assistance, market information and guaranteed price after harvest
(Miyata et al., 2009). Therefore, contract farming is an attractive marketing
channel that can help farmers solve insurance and production constraints
(Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). In contrast, the participation in con-
tract farming may limit farmers’ outside options to sell via other marketing
channels during occasional price spikes.
A number of studies note the benefits of participating in contract farm-
ing. From early studies including Morrissy (1974), Glover (1984), and Minot
(1986), a considerable amount of evidence illustrates that participation in
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contract farming can improve farm income, and thus household welfare (Key
and Runsten, 1999; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al.,
2009; Bellemare, 2012; Michelson, 2013). However, very little quantitative
work has taken into account the potential effects of social relationships in the
context of contract farming. As identified in earlier studies, personal rela-
tionships are important for economic outcomes (Fafchamps, 1998; Woolcock,
1998). I note that in the context of my study, even though I do not observe
an official, binding contract between a trader and a farmer, I can view the
long-term relationship with a trader as a form of unofficial contract farming.
Previous studies on the relationship between a farmer and a trader in de-
veloping countries have been concentrated in Africa. Several studies find
that these relationships help to improve economic conditions and productiv-
ity outcomes (Barrett, 1997; Fafchamps, 1998; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999,
2001). These more favorable outcomes result from a reduction in the time
needed to transport goods and explore market opportunities, better infor-
mation about the market, more stable demand and supply, and reduced loss
from crop spoilage. The help of traders greatly enhances income opportuni-
ties for these small-scale farmers, reducing uncertainties in the quality and
the buyer’s willingness to pay, and in return, traders with well-connected net-
works enjoy higher revenues due to higher sales volume (Fafchamps, 1998;
Fafchamps and Minten, 1999, 2001). There could be several other reasons
that motivate a farmer to commit to a long-term relationship with a partic-
ular trader. One possible explanation is provided in the sociology literature
on rural indebtedness in India.
4.2.2 Rural Indebtedness
Since farmers are often credit constrained agricultural traders are those with
enough financial resources to become potential lenders, they use loans as
a channel to extract profits from farmers who borrow from them (Goyal,
2010). One of the consequences of rural indebtedness is that farmers find
themselves stuck with a particular trader because they have to pay back
their debt. Added to other marketing constraints such as the lack of market
information, inability to verify the quantity of cash crops, indebtedness may
enshrine a farmer’s dependence on a trader, reducing their bargaining power
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and resulting in lower crop returns (Bardhan, 1991; Clay, 2004).
Rural indebtedness is among the most significant causes of economic and
social obstacles to greater farm investments and income growth in agricul-
tural communities, especially in India (Mitra et al., 1986). The cause of
indebtedness from extensive borrowing can originate from various sources
including family, illness, financial, production, consumption, and investment
shocks (Tandon, 1988). This vicious cycle of debt obstructs farmers from
achieving higher economic gains. Also, due to improvements in rural infras-
tructure and production technology, the desire to ensure potential productiv-
ity gains through extensive and costly investments could result in substantial
debt for many small-scale farmers.
4.2.3 Personal Relationships and Economic Outcomes
Personal relationships are important for daily economic activities. These
social networks are viewed as a form of capital that can foster coopera-
tion and coordination, and generate economic returns (Putnam et al., 1993;
Fafchamps, 1998; Woolcock, 1998; Jackson, 2010; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Os-
ter and Thornton, 2012). As a result, social networks may substitute for
market intermediaries, and reduce the transaction costs of marketing. Con-
versely, social networks may enhance the benefit of using a trader, since
market knowledge provided by the trader can now spread further, and the
pooling potential of the social network may generate economies of scale for
the trader themselves. Thus, I wish to determine whether social networks
and long-term relationships with a trader are complements or substitutes in
the sale of cash crops in India.
Fafchamps and Minten (1999) highlight how familiarity and trust in a so-
cial network can help facilitate economic exchange in several regards. The
social network can foster better economic outcomes of the small-scale farmers
through improved access to information, especially about technology adop-
tion and market opportunities (Kranton, 1996). The broader is the network,
the greater are the sources of information. The adoption of a new produc-
tion technology or market mechanism by an individual with a large network is
more likely to result in a significant dispersion of similar adoptions through-
out his social networks (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). Due to this crucial role
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of the social network, I examine how social network characteristics, such as
type, diversity, and location of the household within the network are associ-
ated with the household’s long-term relationship with a trader.
Despite the various functionalities, social networks likely cannot fully repli-
cate some of the roles performed by a trader. Several studies have carefully
analyzed the role of trust between traders and farmers, and argue that it
greatly fosters cooperation (Fafchamps and Minten., 2002). The adoption of
a trader can signal quality of agricultural products to the final buyer because
the trader wants to uphold their reputation with the consumers (Kherallah
and Kirsten, 2002). Thus, through reputation, a trader can help reduce un-
certainties about product quality and delivery facing the buyer. A social
network, on the other hand, is a non-market mechanism that relies heavily
on personal interactions among small-scale farmers. As a result it may not
be able to create trust and reputation between farmer and consumer.
4.3 Data and Setting
4.3.1 Study Area
The study area is Thaltukhod Valley, an area of 17 villages and 522 house-
holds located in the Indian Himalayas.2 Due to missing data, I use infor-
mation from only 510 households.3 Villages vary in size ranging from 11
up to 66 households, and are located at between 1,748 and 2,489 meters of
elevation above the mean sea level.
Like elsewhere in India, Thaltukhod farmers’ main activities include sub-
sistence agriculture, commercial crop cultivation, and livestock rearing. The
forest areas adjoining each village is source of fuel wood, fodder, timber,
fencing, and medicinal herbs. Households in each village own between two
and seven plots varying in size, elevation, and slope. Some plots are shared
among households in the same village. Within each plot, each household
owns a specific parcel. These parcels vary in size within and across villages.
2See Figure 4.2 for map of Thaltukhod Valley, with cash crop production locations,
road access, agricultural fields and forest area.
3I omit households who did not report any social relationships with other households
in the same village.
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In 2008, a comprehensive survey was administered to households in these
villages. Households were asked detailed questions about their livelihood ac-
tivities for the previous four years (2004-2007), and ten years ago (1998). The
survey also collected detailed information about social ties from all house-
holds, and whether the household has a long-term relationship with a trader
and for which crop. Households were also asked about cropping rotation,
land allocation decisions, input expenditures, and revenue from sales of cash
crops.
Based on survey data, Thaltukhod farmers mainly grow three cash crops:
kidney beans, potatoes, and green peas, and three types of food crops: maize,
wheat, and barley.4 Kidney beans and potatoes are traditional cash crops
in Thaltukhod. However, peas were introduced recently, first appearing five
years before the survey was conducted. According to the data from the
survey, all households grow at least one of the three cash crops annually.
They sell their cash crops to traders at the local market multiple times in
a growing season. In this study, I focus on whether a household sells each
of their cash crop to the same trader over a long-term period (at least ten
years). Specifically, approximately 10% of the households growing kidney
beans, 60% of those growing potatoes, and 37% of those growing peas report
having long-term relationship with a trader.
4.3.2 Social Network Information
Using detailed information about interpersonal relationships from all villages
in my sample, I construct a matrix that identifies the links between house-
holds within a social network. All social ties considered in this study are
directed but unweighted.5
I ask two questions about social interactions with peers.6 Each household
is asked to name three households from whom they frequently seek advice
4The revenue from the three main cash crops account for approximately 97% of total
crop revenue among Thaltukhod farmers.
5A directed connection exists from household i to j only if household i reports a connec-
tion with household j but not vice versa. The social ties between households i and j are
unweighted because they do not contain the information on strength of such relationship.
6In the context of this study, peers or friends could also be members of extended fami-
lies, relatives and in-laws. I assume a closed network at the village level only. Therefore, I
assume that cross-village relationships are relatively weak. This assumption is supported
by anecdotal evidence from the initial field work in the area.
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about general livelihood matters, and two households from whom they seek
advice specifically about agriculture.7 I use the union of these two groups
as my basis of a peer group for each household in my study. Thus, each
household can list up to a maximum of five different households as links
within the same social network.8
Using information about social ties among households in each village, I
create a map of social networks for each village in my sample. Then, I use
social network analysis to generate social network characteristics for each
household in a network. I analyze three social networks characteristics of the
households in Thaltukhod Valley. The variables of interest are degree, k-step
reach, and eigenvector. I provide formal definitions of these social network
variables in Appendix A. I also give an illustrative example of the social
network characteristics used in this study in Appendix B. The degree, k-step
reach, and average reciprocal distance variable can help explain how much
information can flow within a network due to its size, spread, and closeness
but they do not fully capture a household’s influence on other households
within the same network. The eigenvector variable captures the influence of
a household with respect to all other households within the same network
since it is a measure of network centrality.
4.3.3 Summary Statistics
The summary statistics of the individual characteristics of the households
who commit to a long-run relationship with a trader and those who do not
are presented in Table 4.1. Farmers who have long-term relationship with
a trader earn slightly higher aggregate household income than those who
do not, but the difference is not statistically significant. Further, farmers
with long-term relationships earn more cash crop revenue than those without
such relationships, and the different is statistically significant. Only two
other characteristics significantly differ between those households who have
and do not have long-term trader relationships: caste and purchased energy.
Specifically, households who have a long-run relationship are more likely to
7Approximately 45% of the households listed only two in the former category as peers
while the remaining named three.
8About 30% of the households listed five distinct other households as their peers while
25% of the households reported that their general peers are also their agricultural peers.
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belong to a higher of the two main castes in the setting, and also use more
purchased energy as part of their total energy use. This finding on caste is
not surprising because all traders working in the area are of higher caste.
Table 4.2 illustrates the summary statistics by types of cash crop culti-
vated. Most of the individual and social networks characteristics are similar
across households that grow each type of crops with a few notable differences.
Of the three main cash crops, farmers make the highest cash crop revenue
from selling potatoes in a growing season. Pea farmers on average own more
land than those who also grow kidney beans and potatoes. Moreover, house-
holds that grow potatoes and peas on average own slightly more stall-fed
cattle, purchase more energy (LPG and kerosene), and consume more food
from their own production. Finally, the ratio of farmers who are high caste
relative to low caste is largest for those who grow peas.
4.4 Conceptual Framework
To explore how social networks associate with the relationship between a
seller (farmer) and a buyer (trader), I model the long-term relationship as
a relational contract following the framework by Gibbons (1997).9 Then, I
discuss the association between social networks and long-term relationships.
To my knowledge, no existing theoretical model in the literature is directly
applicable to the context of this study. However, there are at least two
existing theoretical considerations that might help explain whether social
networks act as complements or substitutes with observed economic outcomes
(Bramoulle´ et al., 2014; Belhaj et al., 2014).
To formalize the long-term relationship between a farmer and a trader, I
begin with the assumption that a farmer plays an infinitely repeated game
with a trader, and then can decide whether to defect or not during each
time period t associated with an interest rate r. According to Gibbons’
formalization, the interest rate r can reflect the likelihood of the parties
9In its simplest form, a long-term trading relationship between a farmer and a trader
can be viewed as one form a relational contract. Due to the nature of such long-term rela-
tionship that does not posses formal enforcement mechanisms, there must be self-enforcing
agreements between the two parties. An example of a formal enforcement mechanism is an
enforcement mechanism by a third party such as a legal court (Gibbons, 1997). Therefore,
in a contract of this nature, agents might decide to continue or stop a relationship as more
information arises. This new information could take the form of trust or reputation.
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trading again after each period.10
In the context of my setting, farmers choose whether to continue in the
long-term relationship with a trader or not. For each time period t, farmer
i decides between the returns from selling crop j to the same trade in this
period or continuation, (Cijt), versus the potential gain from selling to a
different trader in this period or defection, (Dijt), plus the long-run benefits
from selling to different traders who offer the highest prices or independence,
(Iijt+1) minus the search cost for the best offer in each time period t, (Sijt+1).
In my setting, each payoff component could depend on a farmer’s network
characteristics namely Cijt(N), Dijt(N), Iijt+1(N), and Sijt+1(N).
Different network characteristics might affect each component of the pay-
offs in different directions.11 For example, farmers who have peers with
long-term trader relationships may have lower search costs (Sijt+1) because
of the information shared by their peers. For each period, t, the farmer faces
the following decision:
(1 +
1
r
)Cijt(N) > Dijt(N) + (
1
r
)[Iijt+1(N)− Sijt+1(N)]. (4.1)
In each period t, farmer i has two options: continue with the long-term
relationship selling crops to the same trader, or defect and sell to different
traders offering higher prices from then on. Farmer i chooses to continue
the long-term trader relationship in period t only if the expected payoff from
continuing (1+
1
r
)Cijt(N) is greater than the payoff from defection in period t,
Dijt(N), plus the net present value of the payoffs from becoming independent
starting from period t+ 1 onwards minus the search costs for the best prices
offered (
1
r
)[Iijt+1(N)− Sijt+1(N)].
It is useful to consider how the decision of whether to establish a long-
10In my context, the interest rate r could reflect the time value for money and the value
of trust and reputation that could grow over time. For the trader, a farmer might tell other
farmers in his network connection to sell to a particular trader because of his reputation.
On the other hand, a trader might decide to provide the farmers with additional help such
as financial assistance for wedding ceremonies or free seeds as the relationship continues.
11This means that when taking the underlying effects from network connections into
account, the values of each payoff for each farmer could change significantly. In my study,
I observe empirical evidence of both complementarity and substitution between network
connections and long-term relationships. However, such correlation could arise from any
unobserved correlated attributes of the network formation process by itself. Manski (1993)
refers to this scenario as correlated effects, which I cannot capture in this study and is a
limitation.
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term relationship is associated with the decisions made by two connected
agents. On the one hand, farmers in the same social network might decide
to coordinate and establish long-term relationships with a trader in favor
of information exchange, risk pooling, and economies of scale. Such coor-
dination could increase the payoffs from staying in a long-term relationship
Cijt(N) among farmers who share the same traders. In this case, coordina-
tion among social connections and long-term relationships are complements.
On the other hand, certain farmers might decide to refrain from committing
to selling to a particular trader if they believe they could obtain informa-
tion from their peers who have long-term relationships with traders. Some
farmers might think that they have access to information from their peers
which allows them to sell to traders that would offer them the best price in
each season, which is to increase the long-run payoff from selling to different
traders in each period Iijt+1(N);
dIijt+1
dN
> 0. Also, these farmers might real-
ize that their network connections could provide them with sufficient market
information to make marketing decisions, which helps them reduce search
cost Sijt+1(N);
dSijt+1
dN
< 0. This scenario suggests that social networks can
substitute for having long-term relationships.
4.5 Estimation Strategy
4.5.1 Identification
Selection among Farmers
Manski (1993) describes that in the analysis of social interactions, one must
distinguish among exogenous, endogenous and correlated effects. Without
controlling for these three effects, empirical analysis of social networks might
suffer from biased and incorrect interpretations (Matuschke, 2008). Endoge-
nous effects arise because the decision of one’s peers might influence one’s
decision to commit to a long-term relationship with a trader. This simul-
taneity problem is referred to as the reflection problem, where peer outcomes
maybe jointly determined and endogenous (Manski, 1993). Exogenous effects
account for the fact that individuals might belong to the same peer group
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because they share similar observed attributes. For example, farmers who
receive higher education might join the same social network to share infor-
mation they receive from their training classes. Correlated effects explain
the scenario of peers having similar outcomes because they are exposed to
similar local, environmental or cultural contexts. For instance, farmers who
live in the same village might be exposed to similar agro-climatic factors,
geographical constraints, and crop prices, resulting in similar productivity
outcomes.
To account for correlated effects specific to each network, I include network-
level fixed effects to account for unobserved variation across different social
networks. If the correlated effect has a similar impact of all individuals within
a network, it may influence the results in this study. But if the correlated ef-
fect has differential impacts on individuals within a network, and that impact
also varies according to the network structure and leads to individuals having
differential outcomes, I cannot account for such correlated effect in my study.
Similarly, correlated effects might be present among farmers who grow the
same type of crop. To control for this concern, I also include crop-specific
fixed effects in my models that will remove any variation specific to each
cash crop. I control for exogenous effects by including individual observed
attributes and also observed characteristics of peers that might be associated
with the decision to engage in a long-term relationship with a trader.
Selection from Traders
One might be concerned that traders might target specific farmers contingent
on village or type of cash crop to commit to long-term relationships. To
establish a claim against this concern, I explore the statistical evidence from
my data. I ask whether I observe multiple traders operating within a single
village and I find that there are at least three traders buying crops from
farmers within each village. The proportion of the households having long-
term relationship with at least one trader for one of their cash crops ranges
from 47% to 77% among all villages in Thaltukhod. Thus, it is clear that
traders do not have a geographic monopoly, and that all villages have both
farmers who have crop-specific long-term relationships with traders and those
who do not.
In terms of traders’ activities in Thaltukhod villages, I observe that there
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are between three to six traders working with the farmers in each village.
Among the six traders working in the area, traders work with farmers in as
few as three villages, and as many as eight in the entire 17 villages, sug-
gesting that traders do not target which villages they would like to work
with. Moreover, I observe that all six traders buy all of the main cash crops
(kidney beans, potatoes, and peas) from at least one farmer in each village.
Therefore, this statistical evidence argues that traders do not select which
villages and which cash crops to buy from Thaltukhod farmers.
Social Network Formation
One might be worried that the social connections in each village are formed
endogenously due to common unobservable characteristics between peers.
For example, all pea farmers join the same network to gain information about
growing peas.
To test for this concern, I test the likelihood of two households being
friends by using exogenous characteristics namely caste status and geograph-
ical proximity. I find significant evidence that caste status and geographical
proximity are good indicators of peers. Therefore, I argue that the social
connections in Thalthukod are largely formed exogenously.
4.5.2 Econometric Specifications
I test the likelihood that a household commits to a long-term relationship
with a trader using a logistic regression model. Specifically, the estimation
model is of the form:
Pr{y = 1} = 1
1− αl− βx− γx− c− v −  (4.2)
where y represents an n × 1 vector of the binary choice to remain in long-
run relationship with a trader, l is an n × 1 vector of ones, x is an n × k
matrix of observed household individual characteristics and social network
characteristics, c is a matrix of crop-specific fixed effects, and v is a network-
level fixed effects.
Next, I test the hypothesis that a household’s decision to commit to a
long-term relationship depends on the decisions of their peers within the
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same social network. To investigate this hypothesis, I follow the standard
specification of the spatial lag model (Anselin, 1988, 2002), but with some
modifications to accommodate the binary nature of the dependent variable.
The basic spatial probit model with a binary response dependent variable is
given as follows:
y = ρGy + βx+ c+ v +  (4.3)
where ρ represents the autoregressive parameter and G is the weights matrix
of social interactions between households.12
Under this specification, the marginal effect of the spatial autoregressive
term ρ captures the social interaction effects among peer farmers and the
G matrix can also be referred to as the ‘contiguity’ matrix. A positive au-
toregressive market effect estimate ρ implies complementarities among peers’
decisions. This means the probability of farmers’ committing to long-term
relationships with traders increases when their peers also have long-term
relationships with traders. On the other hand, a negative autoregressive
marginal effect estimate ρ implies that farmers’ and their peers’ decisions
are substitutes, which means the likelihood of committing to long-term rela-
tionships decreases when their peers also have long-term relationships with
traders.
Equation (3) allows me to estimate the relationship between a farmer’s
decision to have a long-term relationship with traders and the decisions made
by peers. However, it is likely that a farmer’s decision and the decisions
made by a farmer’s peers are exposed to common unobserved characteristics,
resulting in similar outcomes for y and Gy. This correlation could lead to
an endogeneity problem. To account for this problem, I follow the approach
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) to instrument for peers’ decisions Gy with a
set of instruments z as in the Klier-McMillen linearized GMM spatial binary
response model (Klier and McMillen, 2008).13
12Note that this autoregressive parameter is different from an ordinary spatial autore-
gressive parameter. With this specification, it captures the interaction effect among peers
based on stated social relationships and not the interaction effect among peers due to
geographical proximity.
13Klier and McMillen (2008) use the linearized GMM spatial logit model to study the
agglomeration of auto supplier locations in the United States. In an earlier study by
Holloway et al. (2002), the authors use the spatial probit model to study the adoption of
high-yielding variety (HYV) rice among farmers in Bangladesh.
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The instrument set z I use to account for the endogeneity problem con-
sists of observed attributes of friends, Gx, of friends of friends, G2x, and
of friends of friends of friends G3x similar to the instrument set used in
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). That is, Gx, G2x, and G3x form the instrument
set z for Gy. I argue that friends of friends’ observed attributes can be used
as valid instruments for one’s outcome because they may exogenous affect
friends’ outcome. Thus, the only channel through which friends of friends’
characteristics can affect a farmer’s outcome is through the outcomes of a
farmer’s peers.
4.6 Results and Discussions
4.6.1 Empirical Results
My analysis focuses on three characteristics of social networks: degree, two-
step reach, and eigenvector. In Tables 3 to 4, I report the marginal effects
of the three characteristics from the logit regressions. All marginal effects
reported are evaluated at the mean of the data. In Table 4.3, I first consider
the degree variable, which measures the number of connections a household
has within a network. Its marginal effect estimates suggest that the greater
number of connections a household has within a network, the less likely they
are to have a long-term relationship with a trader for selling their crops,
controlling for both network and crop fixed effects (Table 4.3, Column (4)).
Next, because different crops might exhibit different effects on trader choice,
I split the sample by crop type (Table 4.4). While not consistently statis-
tically significant in all specifications, I find evidence that the household’s
eigenvector is significant for farmers who grow beans and potatoes (Table
4.4, Columns (1) - (4)), and degree is weakly significant (at the 0.15 level)
among farmers who grow peas (Table 4.4, Column (6)). These results indi-
cate that the greater influence a household has within a social network, the
higher likelihood of that household having a long-term trader relationship
among farmers who grow beans and potatoes. Also, I find evidence that the
number of connections a farmer has within a network may substitute for the
farmer’s decision to have a long-term relationship with a trader, particularly
for those who grow peas.
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To provide the magnitude of marginal effect estimates for the social net-
work characteristics, I consider the estimates in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
The statistical significance of the degree variable is more obvious when I
run regressions by pooling all the crops together. Thus, I provide the in-
terpretations of the magnitude of each variable based on the focus on the
specifications in which they have the most obvious significance, and I include
crop-specific fixed effects in order remove any unobserved characteristics spe-
cific to any crop. In Column (4), the marginal effect of the degree variable
indicates that a one unit increase in the degree variable decreases the like-
lihood of the farmer’s having a long-term trader relationship by 0.71 unit,
holding all else constant. In Table 4.4 Columns (2) and (4), I find that a
one unit change in the eigenvector variable is associated with a 0.788 unit
increase in the likelihood of farmers having a long-term trader relationship
among those who grow kidney beans, and a 0.430 unit increase for those who
grow potatoes.
In all specifications, I control for several household characteristics that
might be associated with the household’s decision to enter a long-term re-
lationship with a trader. The control variables include landholding size,
livestock ownership, number of stall-fed cattle, family size, caste, amount
of purchased fuel, and the number of months with own-food consumption.
In Table 4.3, I report the marginal effects for the control variables. I find
that households who own more livestock are more likely to have a long-term
relationship with a trader. Also, households that that have a greater quan-
tity of stall-fed cattle are less likely to have a long-term relationship with a
trader. The caste variable is also significant, which means that households
who belong to the higher of the two main castes in the sample are more likely
to have a long-term relationship with a trader. This result is not surprising
since all six traders working in the area belong to the higher of the two castes
in the area.
Next, I investigate whether the decision of one’s peers to have a long-term
relationship with a trader affects one’s decision to sell to the same trader
for an extended period of time. I instrument peers’ outcomes by using an
instrument set containing peers’ observed characteristics and peers of peers’
observed characteristics as used in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). The parameter
of interest for this test is the spatial autoregressive paper, ρ, in a typical
spatial probit model. In Table 4.5 Panel A, I report the estimates of how
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the decisions of one’s peers to have a long-term relationship with a trader
may affect one’s own decision. I find that on average if one’s peers have a
long-term relationship with a trader, the marginal effect of one’s having a
long-term relationship with a trader increases by approximately 43% when
controlling for both network and crop fixed effects (Table 4.4, Column (4)).
I find that even after when controlling for the decisions of friends, I still find
negative and significant marginal effects estimates for the degree variable
after controlling for network and crop fixed effects (Table 4.5, Columns (2)
and (4)). This suggests that peers’ decisions to establish establish a long-term
relationship with a trader does not entirely dominate the effects of the degree
variable, the number of connections a household has within the network.
I consider the decision to enter a long-term relationship with a trader
contingent on peers’ decisions separately by each crop. In Table 4.6 Panel A, I
observe a strong and significant relationship between farmers’ and their peers’
decisions to enter in a long-term relationship with a trader only for the sales
of peas and potatoes, both when controlling for network fixed effects and I do
not. When controlling for network fixed effects, I find that a one unit increase
in the decision of peers on average to have a long-term trader relationship
leads to a 0.487 and a 0.032 unit increase in the marginal effects of farmers
also have a long-term trader relationship. This result makes intuitive sense
because from the fieldwork, I learned that the cultivation and marketing
processes of potatoes are associated to higher uncertainties than those of
peas, which may necessitate greater information from peers.
Potatoes are subject to idiosyncratic production shocks and storage un-
certainties.14 Therefore, having a long-term relationship may be necessary
and beneficial for the marketing of potatoes. My results are consistent with
those of another study about the marketing of potatoes in India by Mitra
et al. (2013), the authors find that supplying potato farmers in West Bengal
with information from nearby potato wholesale markets does not help them
reduce the middleman margins when they try to sell their potatoes after
14The uncertainty associated with potatoes is mainly due to disease shocks and storage
life. Potato blight largely affects all producers in a region at the same time, resulting in
substantial shocks to supply, causing the price of potatoes sold to fluctuate greatly over
time. The long storage life of the potatoes allows them to be stored up to two years,
allowing retailers to mitigate against these potential supply shocks. A farmer will neither
necessarily know about blight in a neighboring production area, nor how many potatoes
are currently in storage in the primary retail markets. Thus, potato producers do not
observe these key components of expected market price unless informed by a trader.
97
harvest.
For the marketing of peas, I find that both the decisions of peers to have
a long-term relationship and farmers’ social network characteristics are im-
portant for a farmer’s decision to have a relationship with a trader. The
results are not surprising given that peas were introduced to local farmers in
the Thaltukhod Valley recently, and farmers might not have sufficient knowl-
edge and market information about the production of peas. As for kidney
beans, being a traditional crop that has been cultivated in the area for a
long time, farmers are very familiar its production practices and marketing
strategies. Moreover, the marketing of kidneys is subject to relatively low
uncertainty compared to potatoes and peas because kidney beans can be
stored for extended periods after harvest.
4.6.2 Robustness Checks
Proximity Effects
One might be concerned that my results are largely driven by geographical
proximity, which might be correlated with unobservable characteristics such
as distance to paved roads or other factors that might affect the decision
to adopt a long-term trader relationship. A number of other studies define
one’s peers as those who are the households who are geographically proximate
peers including Liverpool-Tasie and Winter-Nelson (2012) and Helmers and
Patnam (2014). To investigate this concern, I test whether the decision to
enter in a long-term relationship with a trader of the farmers who live in close
proximity have a significant impact on a household’s long-term relationship
with a trader.
In Panel B of Tables 4 and 6, I replace the weights matrix based on self-
reported relationships between farmers in my sample with the weights matrix
based on geography. In particular, I define geographic neighbors as four
closest neighbors based on Euclidean distance from GPS coordinates. My
results show that the spatial autoregressive parameter based on geographic
neighbors are not significant, suggesting that the results are not largely driven
by unobserved location-specific characteristics.
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Top Coding
One might worry about the issue of top-coding, that by the construction of
the survey questions about social ties, I leave out a number of links that
households did not get to report. Two studies involving peer network in-
formation by de Weerdt (2002), and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) report
considerable missing information, which could lead to biased estimates due
to loss of information of social ties (Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011).
To account for this concern, I row-normalize the social interaction matrix
between households in each social network. By row-normalizing the interac-
tion matrix, I assume that all peers that each farmers report to have close
relationships with have equal effects for one’s outcome. Moreover, in my
dataset, 45% of the households reported only a two links per category in the
pre-survey qualitative interviews conducted before the survey was adminis-
tered.
Individual Heterogeneity
One may be concerned that my results are driven by unobserved individual
heterogeneity across farmers in my sample. Specifically, high earning farmers
may not require a long-term relationship with a trader due to greater outside
options. On the other hand, low-earning farmers may similarly require to
establish long-term relationships with a trader because they due to their
high marketing and management constraints. Low-earning farmers may also
be clustered together together in networks, which could also drive the results.
These two scenarios together may generate spurious effects across the sample
which may imitate social effects between peers and drive the results.
To test for this possibility, I eliminate farmers whose cash crop revenues
are in the highest and lowest deciles for each village in my sample. In Table
4.7, Panel A, I still find positive and significant effects of friends’ on farmers’
decision to establish a long-term relationship with a trader in all but one of
my specifications. When controlling for both network and crop fixed effects,
the effect is weakly significant (p-value = 0.012). Therefore, I verify that
unobserved individual heterogeneity which may mimic social effects from
peers’ decisions do not largely drive my findings.
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Peer Effects Model
Another model specification in the literature that investigates the association
between social networks and outcome is the peer effects framework, which
assumes that both peers’ outcome and peers’ characteristics may explain
one’s outcome. Building on the theoretical works by Manski (1993), Moffitt
(2001) and Lee (2007), Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), and Helmers and Patnam
(2014) provide empirical evidence that the outcome of peers and some of
peers’ observed attributes are important determinants of one’s outcome.
To control for the possibility that peers’ observed attributes could also
related to one’s decision to establish long-term relationships with a trader,
I provide another specification under the peer effects framework. The peer
effects framework specifies an individual’s outcome may be explained by his
peers’ outcomes, his own observed attributes and his peers’ observed at-
tributes (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001). I regress a farmers’ decision to enter
a long-term relationship with a trader as a function of their own characteris-
tics and the average characteristics of their peers and present the results in
Table 4.7, Panel B. Similar to our earlier findings, I find strong and significant
effects of peers’ decisions on a farmer’s decision to commit to a long-term
relationship. Therefore, peers’ observed attributes (including their social net-
work characteristics) may also help explain a farmers’ decision to establish
a long-term relationship in addition to his own observed characteristics and
social network characteristics.
Linear Probability Model
Finally, in Table 4.8, I run a set of alternative specifications similar to the
ones in Table 4.5 except that I use a linear probability model instead. The
results indicate that the coefficient estimates reported in Table 4.8 are smaller
than the marginal effects reported in Table 4.5. However, the significance
levels of the variables of interests remain largely unchanged.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the decision made by small-scale farmers in India
to invest in a long-term relationship with a trader. The data come from a
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survey conducted of 522 households in 17 villages in Thaltukhod Valley in
Himachal Pradesh, India. I put together a dataset containing the household
level individual characteristics that captures economic conditions, social sta-
tus, education level, and geographical details. I also construct social network
variables that indicate the type, diversity, and position of each household
within the social networks of each village from the weights matrix that de-
termine the links between the households. Then, I perform econometric anal-
yses of the likelihood that each household decides to establish a long-term
relationship with a trader to help them sell their agricultural produce based
on the individual household’s demographic, economic, and social network
characteristics.
The main findings from this study can be summarized as follows. First,
I find that if a farmer’s peers commit to a trader long-term relationship,
the farmer is more likely to do so as well. Specifically, I find significant
effects among farmers who grow potatoes and peas, but not among those
who grow kidney beans, which might be subject to lower uncertainties in
their cultivation and marketing processes. Second, different characteristics
of a household’s village social network can either perform as complements
(position) or substitutes (number of connections) with a long-term relation-
ship with a trader as these network characteristics reflect different levels of
exposure to market information for each agricultural household in each vil-
lage of Thaltukhod Valley. Third, households observed characteristics such
as caste, opportunity cost of agricultural labor, and the dependence on the
market consumption are positively correlated with the investment in a long-
run relationship with a trader. And most importantly, farmers make the
decision to commit to a trader given their crop choice. Potatoes are more
likely to be commercialized through a long-term relationship with a trader
due to its high level of uncertainty, while kidney beans are least likely to
be marketed through a trader since they contain the lowest level of hidden
information.
The results presented in this paper highlight the importance of social net-
works in reducing transaction costs facing small-scale farmers in India when
they sell their crops. Although certain household and network characteris-
tics are likely to be more important in determining the decision to have a
crop-specific, long-run relationship with at least one trader, I would like to
further evaluate to what extent these factors matter. Moreover, the regres-
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sion results from the spatial econometric specifications indicate that farmers’
decision to make a specific investment depends on the decisions of their peers,
rather than geographic distance. In other words, peer effects dominate geo-
graphical effects for a small-scale farmer in deciding to invest in a long-term
relationship with a trader.
My results may help highlight the importance of market access for small-
scale farmers in a developing country setting, specially in India. A study by
Mallory and Baylis (2013) points out that agricultural markets do not usually
stay open long after harvest, which may limit opportunities for farmers to
access them later in the season. One channel that may help farmers mitigate
the limited access to markets is through the use of traders, who can help
provide them with market information, guarantee constant demand for their
crops, and become the source for lending. As noted earlier in the paper,
for a given range of cash crop revenues earned by farmers , farmers who
have long-term trader relationships earn higher revenues than those who do
not, and also greater than those who do not have trader relationships and
whose friends also do not. This evidence suggests that relying on peers for
information and other uses, while important, may not be able to fully imitate
the functionality of a trader.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics (By Long-term Relationship with Trader)
Long-term Relationship No Relationship
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Income (1000 rupees) 25.203 50.884 21.981 22.367
Cash crop revenue (1000 rupees) 9.800 7.530 8.775 7.309
Grow kidney beans (1=yes) 0.593 0.492 0.567 0.497
Grow potatoes (1=yes) 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Grow peas (1=yes) 0.550 0.498 0.498 0.501
Degree 0.217 0.142 0.208 0.146
Two-step reach 0.603 0.263 0.565 0.276
Eigenvectors 0.222 0.142 0.195 0.155
Elevation (meters) 2049.28 197.83 2040.73 192.23
Land (bhigas) 8.441 5.755 8.190 9.863
Livestock (units) 0.632 1.105 0.488 0.852
Stall-fed cattle (number) 0.550 0.816 0.463 0.816
Purchased energy (% of total use) 0.612 9.979 0.069 0.755
Own-food consumption (m./y.r) 2.956 1.203 2.971 1.159
Family size (head count) 5.756 2.301 5.655 2.419
Caste (1=higher) 0.886 0.318 0.798 0.402
Observations 307 203
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics (By Type of Crop Grown)
Kidney Beans Potatoes Peas
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Long-term relationship (1=yes) 0.094 0.292 0.601 0.489 0.374 0.484
Cash crop revenue (1000 rupees) 1.015 1.114 5.545 4.437 2.832 5.552
Degree 0.265 0.145 0.214 0.258 0.261 0.153
Two-step reach 0.695 0.242 0.588 0.268 0.683 0.253
Eigenvector 0.241 0.140 0.211 0.148 0.238 0.139
Elevation (meters) 2158.61 152.14 2045.87 195.47 2171.97 153.16
Land (bhigas) 9.175 8.896 8.341 7.651 10.046 9.145
Livestock (units) 0.515 1.066 0.575 1.013 0.578 1.127
Stall-fed cattle (number) 0.438 0.751 0.516 0.817 0.507 0.812
Purchased energy (%) 0.290 3.644 0.396 3.133 0.489 4.081
Own-food consumption (m./yr.) 2.751 0.956 2.962 1.185 2.944 1.026
Family size (head count) 5.774 2.322 5.716 2.347 5.748 2.308
Caste (1=higher) 0.879 0.327 0.851 0.356 0.959 0.198
Observations 297 510 270
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Table 4.3: Marginal effects of the likelihood of long-term relationship (LR)
by crop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LR LR LR LR
Social network measures
Degree -0.368 -0.635∗ -0.306 -0.710∗∗
(0.206) (0.329) (0.220) (0.349)
Two-step reach 0.107 0.192 0.138 0.231
(0.111) (0.157) (0.118) (0.167)
Eigenvector 0.238 0.242 0.133 0.207
(0.168) (0.199) (0.178) (0.206)
Household Controls
Land 0.011 0.040 0.049 0.044
(0.038) (0.044) (0.040) (0.046)
Livestock 0.182∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗
(0.084) (0.087) (0.092) (0.095)
Stall-fed cattle -0.067 -0.085∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.103∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053)
Family size 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Caste 0.169∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.047) (0.071) (0.050) (0.065)
Purchased fuel 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Own-food consumption -0.005 -0.021 -0.025 -0.020
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021)
Network FE - Yes - Yes
Crop FE - - Yes Yes
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of data.
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Table 4.4: Marginal effects of the likelihood of long-term relationship (LR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LR LR LR LR LR LR
Beans Beans Potato Potato Peas Peas
Social network measures
Degree -0.153 0.142 -0.551 0.621 -0.234 -1.15+
(0.196) (0.531) (0.451) (0.495) (0.397) (0.754)
Two-step reach 0.036 0.306 0.169 0.132 0.131 0.456
(0.113) (0.208) (0.339) (0.231) (0.232) (0.335)
Eigenvector 0.368∗ 0.788∗ 0.402∗ 0.430+ 0.119 0.158
(0.203) (0.394) (0.560) (0.270) (0.408) (0.642)
Household Controls
Elevation -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.003)
Land 0.072 0.049 0.066 -0.058 0.003 -0.049
(0.078) (0.094) (0.055) (0.064) (0.076) (0.092)
Livestock 0.526∗∗ 0.460∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.454∗ 0.404
(0.248) (0.245) (0.150) (0.148) 0.254 (0.268)
Family size 0.013 0.017 -0.002 -0.0004 0.009 0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Caste 0.117 -0.200 0.131∗ 0.214∗∗ -0.170 -0.284∗∗
(0.122) (0.215) (0.074) (0.109) (0.145) (0.129)
Purchased fuel 0.000 0.000 0.052∗ 0.050∗ 0.036 0.019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
Own-food consumption -0.073∗ -0.055 -0.035 -0.036 -0.035 -0.003
(0.042) (0.049) (0.023) (0.027) (0.038) (0.046)
Stall-fed cattle -0.219 -0.187 -0.135 -0.128 -0.198 -0.178
(0.014) (0.133) (0.083) (0.082) (0.139) (0.144)
Network FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 294 293 510 510 270 270
Robust standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of data.
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Table 4.5: Marginal Effects of long-term relationship (LR) based on social
network characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LR LR LR LR
Panel A. Self-reported peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho 0.632∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.156) (0.155) (0.166)
Social network measures
Degree -0.762 -1.879∗∗ -0.783 -2.15∗∗
(0.759) (0.840) (0.819) (0.916)
Two-step reach 0.257 -0.482 0.326 -0.144
(0.561) (0.913) (0.614) (0.990)
Eigenvector 0.457 0.607 0.035 0.458
(0.432) (0.500) (0.461) (0.522)
Panel B. Geographic peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho -0.108 0.076 0.040 0.098
(0.080) (0.088) (0.086) (0.098)
Social network measures
Degree -1.357 -1.588∗ -1.050 -1.787∗∗
(0.745) (0.833) (0.801) (0.906)
Two-step reach -0.225 -0.645 0.031 -0.336
(0.552) (0.912) (0.606) (0.984)
Eigenvector 0.670 0.581 0.155 0.429
(0.428) (0.498) (0.458) (0.517)
HH Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network FE - Yes - Yes
Crop FE - - Yes Yes
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: HH controls include landholding, livestock ownership, family size, caste,
use of purchased fuel, own-food consumption (months/year) and stall-fed cat-
tle. Geographical distance weights matrix uses 4-nearest neighbor specifica-
tion. Rho represents spatial autoregressive parameter.
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Table 4.6: Marginal Effects of long-term relationship (LR) based on social
network characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LR LR LR LR LR LR
Beans Beans Potato Potato Peas Peas
Panel A. Self-reported peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho -0.001 -0.003 0.328∗∗ 0.487∗∗ -0.018 0.032∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.192) (0.026) (0.075) (0.026)
Social network measures
Degree -0.522 -0.759 -1.623 -1.813 -0.554 -0.734
(0.419) (0.424) (1.118) (2.272) (0.427) (0.480)
Two-step reach 0.195 0.007 0.339 0.449 0.630 0.453
(0.312) (0.424) (0.846) (1.296) (0.427) (0.480)
Eigenvector 0.415 0.362 0.947 1.189 0.222 0.485
(0.227) (0.269) (0.610) (0.703) (0.405) (0.466)
Panel B. Geographic peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho -0.017 -0.128 -0.001 0.044 -0.039 -0.032
(0.023) (0.284) (0.052) (0.029) (0.023) (0.026)
Social network measures
Degree -0.475 -0.759 -0.522 -0.809 -0.469 -0.554
(0.311) (0.424) (0.419) (0.758) (0.551) (0.555)
Two-step reach 0.190 0.007 0.195 0.049 0.605 0.630
(0.311) (0.424) (0.312) (0.422) (0.424) (0.427)
Eigenvector 0.351 0.362 0.415 0.472 0.469 0.222
(0.237) (0.269) (0.227) (0.259) (0.424) (0.405)
Network FE - Yes - Yes - Yes
Observations 297 297 521 521 276 276
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: HH controls include landholding, livestock ownership, fam-
ily size, caste, use of purchased fuel, own-food consumption
(months/year) and stall-fed cattle. Geographical distance weights
matrix uses 4-nearest neighbor specification. Rho represents spatial
autoregressive parameter.
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Table 4.7: Robustness Checks: Marginal Effects of long-term relationship
(LR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LR LR LR LR
Panel A. Individual Heterogeneity
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho 0.535∗∗∗ 0.188 0.368∗∗ 0.266+
(0.143) (0.169) (0.160) (0.181)
Panel B. Peer Effects Model
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho 0.791∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.196) (0.192) (0.211)
Network FE - Yes - Yes
Crop FE - - Yes Yes
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: HH controls include landholding, livestock ownership, family size, caste,
use of purchased fuel, own-food consumption (months/year) and stall-fed cat-
tle. Geographical distance weights matrix uses 4-nearest neighbor specifica-
tion. Rho represents spatial autoregressive parameter.
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Table 4.8: Likelihood of long-term relationship (LR) based on social
network characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LR LR LR LR
Panel A. Self-reported peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho 0.241∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.058) (0.049) (0.056)
Social network measures
Degree -0.355∗ -0.691∗∗ -0.239 -0.708∗∗
(0.201) (0.306) (0.189) (0.284)
Two-step reach 0.033 0.206 0.147 0.188
(0.099) (0.138) (0.091) (0.132)
Eigenvector 0.159 0.231 0.064 0.213
(0.159) (0.180) (0.143) (0.167)
Panel B. Geographic peers
Spatial autoregressive parameter
Rho -0.039 0.033 0.011 0.341
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031)
Social network measures
Degree -0.417∗∗ -0.595∗ -0.255 -0.610∗∗
(0.198) (0.307) (0.188) (0.286)
Two-step reach 0.003 0.176 0.122 0.157
(0.100) (0.141) (0.091) (0.134)
Eigenvector 0.263 0.228 0.111 0.208
(0.003) (0.180) (0.144) (0.168)
HH Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Network FE - Yes - Yes
Crop FE - - Yes Yes
Observations 1,077 1,077 1,077 1,077
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: HH controls include landholding, livestock ownership, family size, caste,
use of purchased fuel, own-food consumption (months/year) and stall-fed cat-
tle. Geographical distance weights matrix uses 4-nearest neighbor specifica-
tion. Rho represents spatial autoregressive parameter.
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Figure 4.1: Cash Crop Revenue Kernel Density
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Figure 4.2: Production Locations of Cash Crops in Thaltukhod Valley.
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Figure 4.3: Village 6 - Tegar
Figure 4.4: Village 14 - Bhumchayan
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I address the importance of two external factors that are
associated with the variation in farm outcomes in a developing country set-
ting: markets and social institutions. The setting of my dissertation is India,
where access to market and production information can be limited. Thus,
having differential access to markets and information may translate to sub-
stantially different outcomes among farmers. Even if the access to markets
improves, farmers may face other constraints to their marketing strategies.
In the chapters of my dissertation, I argue that the access to information
(Chapters 2 and 4), physical markets (Chapter 3), and agricultural credit
(Chapter 3) may vary substantially among farmers within the same village
and in the same time period. Informal institutions, such as social networks,
can play a large role in enabling access to markets and information. There-
fore, farmers may rely on their peer networks for market information and
to reduce transactions costs. Understanding factors that may help farm-
ers improve their crop revenues is particularly important for both welfare
analysis and policy. Small-scale farmers earn a substantial portion of their
income from selling cash crops, and spend the majority of their income on
food. Thus, a small increase in received crop prices can greatly increase their
household income, and may help improve their welfare outcomes.
In Chapter 2, I test whether peer effects help explain the variation in
farmers’ cash crop revenues. Using individual-level information about so-
cial relationships from a household survey, I follow an identification strategy
which allows me to account for the problem of peers’ outcomes being endoge-
nous (Lee, 2007; Bramoulle´ et al., 2009). While noting the significance of
peer effects on farmers’ cash crop revenues, I provide a back-of-the-envelope
calculation to show that peer effects through input use and land allocation
cannot fully explain the peer effects in cash crop revenues. This finding sug-
gests that peers may be important for other factors including management,
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negotiation and marketing strategies of farmers as well. I extend my analysis
to cover different definitions of peer networks, and find the most significant
effect among self-reported peers, which suggests that our findings are not
largely driven by the effects of geographical proximity or caste groups.
In Chapter 3, I explore how differential access to agricultural credit and
markets affect farm gate prices at the time of sale. Using a longitudinal house-
hold survey with detailed crop transaction data, combined with geocoded
weekly market price and delivery data, I exploit the plausibly exogenous
variation in credit provision ahead of state-level elections (Cole, 2009). My
results indicate that increased access to credit from public banks ahead of
elections along with greater market access increase farm gate prices for crops
other than paddy and wheat. Paddy and wheat are under heavy interven-
tion by the federal government through direct procurement throughout the
year. I find the strongest effect of increased credit on prices among small
farmers, who might have very few options for agricultural credit, and may
be expected to benefit more from increased credit provision. Larger farmers
also benefit from increased credit through being able to borrow more cheaply
at a lower interest rates, but these lower interest rates do not translate to
higher farm gate prices. I verify that the results are not largely driven by
government-sponsored agricultural assistance programs including crop insur-
ance and input subsidies.
In Chapter 4, I explore the association between farmers’ social network
characteristics and their decisions to have a crop-specific long-term relation-
ship with at least one agricultural trader. While traders may help farmers
by providing market information and guarantee demand for their cash crops,
they are usually also the source of credit. Requiring credit for cultivation
purposes, farmers have to sell their crops immediately after harvest, result-
ing in lower prices for their crops, which raises the concern about farmers
facing constantly hefty interest rates for their agricultural credit (Mitra et al.,
1986). Using a household survey containing detailed information about inter-
personal relationships, I use social network analysis to derive social network
characteristics of farmer in my sample. I find that farmers who have a lower
number of connections and who are more centrally located within their social
networks are more likely to have long-term, crop-specific relationships with
agricultural traders. Moreover, using a novel spatial econometric method,
I find that the decision to have a long-term relationship is also dependent
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on that of farmers’ peers. Finally, I show that the effects of geographical
proximity do not drive the results.
The results from my dissertation may help motivate future research to rig-
orously evaluate the importance of markets and social institutions on rural
development policies. First, in Chapter 4, I observe that farmers who have
access to a formal market mechanism, a long-term crop-specific relationship
with trader, earn higher revenues from selling cash crops. However, In Chap-
ter 3, we learned that the opportunities to improve farm outcomes for farmers
may be limited, especially among farmers who do not have much bargaining
power due to the lack of access to agricultural credit. Thus, an attractive
policy intervention is to help farmers improve their bargaining power with
traders through increasing their access both to credit and to market infor-
mation.
Another notable finding from my dissertation is that peers have a sig-
nificant effect on farmers’ behavior, whether it be by affecting agricultural
revenue or the choice of market mechanism. On the one hand, finding sig-
nificant peer effects is attractive for agricultural extension purposes for peer
may help enhance extension efforts to disseminate information, as I have dis-
cussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. On the other hand, strong peer effects
also indicate that struggling farmers tend to associate with other struggling
farmers, implying that groups of farmers may be left behind if they are not
specifically targeted by extension practices. Thus, extension efforts have to
provide access to farmers who belong to different social groups to ensure
greater coverage of knowledge and information.
A number of research questions can be explored based on the results from
my dissertation. For instance, in Chapter 2, I find that peer effects on input
use and land allocation cannot fully explain the peer effects on cash crop
revenues. One possible hypothesis is that the remaining unexplained por-
tion of the peer effects may be attributed to peers having access to the same
agricultural traders, which could be a testable hypothesis. As I have iden-
tified significant peer effects in Chapters 2 and 4, one may investigate how
the magnitude of peer effects might change farmers’ bargaining power with
their traders. Another possible topic is to explore how information diffuses
within a social network. One could introduce a piece of information to differ-
ent nodes within a network and observes how that piece of information gets
transmitted through different nodes, which could be useful for the design of
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rural development programs to guarantee sufficient coverage of agricultural
extension efforts. In summary, it is evident that access to markets and so-
cial institutions (such as peer networks) can explain some variation in farm
outcomes. A better understanding of how these two factors interact, and the
detailed mechanisms through which they affect farm outcomes can facilitate
policy prescriptions and extension efforts to help improve farm outcomes in
the future.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 2
A.1 Identification of Peer Effects
Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) explain how this set of instruments can identify peer
effects through social networks. First, consider Equation (7), since generally
|β| < 1 and the matrix I − βG is invertible, the reduced form of Equation
(7) can be written as follows:
y = α(I − βG)−1l + (I − βG)−1(γI + δG)x+ (I − βG)−1. (A.1)
As (I −βG)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
βkGk and there is no household with no peers, I can
rewrite Equation (8) as follows:
y =
α
(1− β)l + γx+ (γβ + δ)
∞∑
k=0
βkGk+1x+
∞∑
k=0
βkGk. (A.2)
Thus, I can rewrite Equation (9) in terms of the conditional expectation of
the cash crop revenue of peers in an individual’s peer group on x as follows:
E[Gy|x] = α
(1− β)l + γGx+ (γβ + δ)
∞∑
k=0
βkGk+2x. (A.3)
From Equation (10), the conditional expectation of the average cash crop
revenue of peers in an individual’s peer group on x can be expressed further
as:
E[Gy|x] = α
(1− β)l + b0x+ b1Gx+ b2G
2x (A.4)
where b2 6= 0 if β 6= 0 and γβ + δ 6= 0. Thus, Lee (2007) shows that one
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can use G2x as a valid instrument set for Gy. Under this specification, peer
effects through social networks can be identified.
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Instrument Robustness Support
Instruments Test statistics
Robust pairwise correlation
Proportion of cash crop land 0.391∗∗∗
Livestock 0.278∗∗∗
Family members 15-60 years -0.076∗∗
Caste 0.974∗∗∗
Total land holding 0.055∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: First-stage Estimates of Endogenous Peer Effects
(1) (2)
Endog. Effects Endog. Effects
OLS OLS
Own characteristics
Proportion of cash crop land -0.295∗ -0.137
(0.163) (0.143)
Caste -0.096 -0.096
(0.233) (0.181)
Livestock -0.007 -0.009
(0.013) (0.012)
Family members 15-60 years 0.001 0.005
(0.008) (0.006)
Total land holding 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
Included instruments
Proportion of cash crop land 1.607∗∗∗ 1.494∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.197)
Caste -0.175 -0.215
(0.437) (0.293)
Livestock 0.203∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029)
Family members 15-60 years 0.017 0.011
(0.018) (0.016)
Total land holding 0.054∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Excluded instruments
Proportion of cash crop land -0.599∗∗ -1.243∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.326)
Caste 0.899∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.258)
Livestock 0.123∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.040)
Family members 15-60 years -0.005 -0.048∗∗
(0.025) (0.024)
Total land holding -0.011∗∗ -0.010
(0.005) (0.007)
Network FE - Yes
Test statistics
R-square 0.723 0.813
Observations 509 509
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Top-Coding: Estimates of Cash Crop Revenue (rupees)
(1) (2)
Revenue Revenue
OLS 2SLS
Endogenous peer effects
Endogenous effect 0.169∗ 0.542∗
(0.0911) (0.250)
Observations 283 283
Note: This table reports peer effects estimates of possible mech-
anisms that may underlie my peer effects estimates on cash crop
revenue. All specifications in this table are estimated using 2SLS
approach with the same set of control variables in the main speci-
fication: proportion of cash crop land, livestock ownership, family
members aged 15-60, caste and total land holding.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 4
B.1 Definitions of Network Characteristics
This section provides formal definitions of social network characteristic vari-
ables in this paper. Jackson (2010) provides a comprehensive review on other
measures of social networks.
A map of social network (N,G) consists of nodes (i.e. farm households),
N = {1, ..., n}, and a binary social interaction matrix G of dimension nxn.
gij represents elements of matrix G where gij = 1 if two farm households i
and j are connected and 0 otherwise.
• Degree Centrality
Degree centrality di(g) refers to the proportion of of links connected to
a node i to the total number of nodes. A node with degree n−1 would
be directly linked to all other nodes in a graph and is quite central in
the network.
di(g) =
∑
j
gij/(n− 1)
• Eigenvector Centrality
The eigenvector centrality ei represents the eigenvector centrality for a
social network G (Bonacich, 1972). The centrality of node i is propor-
tional to the sum of eigenvector centrality of all its connected nodes.
Let λ be the propotionality factor.
λei = gi1e1 + ...+ ginen =
∑
j
gijej
• Average Reciprocal Distance (ARD)
The average reciprocal distance (ARD) is a measure of closeness cen-
trality. In other words, it indicates how short the paths between nodes
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are. A greater value of ARD indicates that the node is more connected
to other nodes in a network. Let pj be the length of path between node
i and node j and Ci is the closeness parameter.
Ci = 1/
∑
j
pjgij
ARD is usually normalized with respect to the maximum value of
closedness, so in percentage terms, ARD is defined as follows.
ARDi = Ci/(Cmax − Cmin)
• K-Neighborhood and K-step Reach
A neighborhood of node i is a set of all nodes that node i is directly
linked to.
Ni(g) = {j : gij = 1}
The neighborhood of set of nodes S is the union of the neighborhoods
of its members.
NS(g) = ∪i∈S = {j : ∃i ∈ S, gij = 1}
The k-neighborhood of a node i is the set of all nodes that can be
reached by k steps from node i.
Nki (g) = Ni(g) ∪ (∪j∈Ni(g)Nk−1j (g))
The k-step reach is the proportion of all nodes in a map that can be
reached within k steps from node i.
RNki (g) = (n− 1)/Nki (g)
B.2 Illustration of Social Network Characteristics
To provide a better understanding of the network measurements discussed
earlier, consider the two maps of social networks in village 6, Tegar and
village 14, Bhumchayan, presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
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As a comparison, compare household number 5 in village 6 (labeled as
HH5 in Figure 4.3) and household number 16 in village 14 (labeled as HH16
in Figure 4.4). Both households are circled in red in the village network
maps. Although both households appear to be centrally located within each
network, they have very different values of eigenvector and two-step reach
variables. For the eigenvector variable, the eigenvector value of household 5
in village 6 is 0.411 whereas that of household 16 in village 14 is 0.226. The
explanation of such difference in eigenvector values is that as the network
of village 14 is much larger than the network of village 6 (because there are
more households in village 14 than in village 6), the degree of influence a
central household has on all the other households in a bigger network is less
than that of a central household that belongs to a smaller network. The
two-step reach of these two households is also different. The two-step reach
of household 5 in village 6 is 0.371. This figure indicates that within two
steps, this household can reach 37.1% of all the households in this network.
On the other hand, in a much denser network as in village 14, the two-step
reach variable of household 16 is 0.969. This means that almost all of the
households within this network can be reached from this household within
two steps. To summarize the difference between the two network variables, I
can think of the two-step reach variable as a measure of pure information flow
within a social network. However, the eigenvector variable mainly captures
the influential effects of a node on the other nodes within the same network.
The summary statistics of the social network variables (presented in Ta-
ble 4.1) clearly indicate that households with higher network eigenvectors
are more likely to establish a long-term relationship a trader for a long-term
relationship to help them sell their cash crops. The degree variable, which
measures the average number of links, or network contacts, a household has,
is slightly higher among households dealing with a trader. The k-step reach
variable, which in this study uses k=2, measures the number of nodes within
the network reachable within 2 steps, has a mean of 0.55 among the house-
holds that do not use a trader and 0.60 among those that do. This statistic
means that 55 or 60 percent of the network are friends of friends.
The average reciprocal distance variable is a measure of closeness of central-
ity. It indicates the average shortest possible path length between a node in
network and any other nodes is in the network. I observe almost no difference
in this category between those that do not use a trader and those who use
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a trader (0.49 to 0.51). The last network variable of interest is the eigenvec-
tor variable. The eigenvector defines centrality by indicating how connected
one household is to all the other households within the same network. Put
differently, the eigenvector is an indicator of how important a node is in the
entire network. Due to this feature, this measurement can help describe the
degree of influence a node has on its neighboring nodes. Households that are
in contact with at least one trader have an average eigenvector of 0.22, which
is only slightly higher than those who do not (0.19). Therefore, given the
statistics of these network variables, there is some evidence that the structure
of the social networks has an impact on the household’s decision to have a
long-term relationship to help commercialize their agricultural produce.
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